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Case Assignment Instructions and Link

The Assigned Case – A.P. Moller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives.Link:

https://hbr.org/product/a-p-moller-maersk-group-ev…

(Is attached as PDF: 412147-PDF-ENG.PDF)

General Instructions Overview

The outcome of this assignment is a

written report/research paper

. The general paper should be an assessment and recommendation of the Case using the ADDIE Model. Do not over complicate the assignment. Read the Case then follow the ADDIE Model to write your paper. It’s that easy. Details of the ADDIE Model and the rubrics used for grading are included in the module.

This is a ten point assignment and as such should be fairly comprehensive. I would expect about 1,000-1,250 words is sufficient.

You are to use at least 5 ACADEMIC references to support your paper. Include these in your Reference section.

Make sure you follow the APA guidelines and are appropriately documented in terms of references and in-text citations.

Additional information and detailed instructions are included below and in the module.

Detailed Instructions

Read the instructions very carefully. ALSO, open both Grading rubrics (2) and read over them carefully. Prepare an outline using only the headings of “Strategic Application”Rubric #1. Next, go to the Harvard Publishing website and purchase and download your case. Read it slowly and carefully the first time through. Then, read it again making notes along the way. As you progress through the text material, continue to review the case and start filling in the outline, keeping in mind the case instructions, the ADDIE model and the Rubric requirements. As you start to write your paper, review APA formatting requirements, grammar, punctuation, spelling, word usage, sentence structure, etc. Your grade will be based on these rubrics.

Assignment Details

This course focuses on the models, concepts, and phases of the ADDIE (ADiME) Model of assessing, designing, developing, implementing and evaluating a training and development program. This paper is an opportunity to apply the models and concepts to the case study entitled “A.P. Moller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives.” The elements of your paper are to be helpful to Moller and Maersk (M&M); to improve their effectiveness through the development of a training program. A suggested way to accomplish this project is to read and become familiar with the case study first. As you learn about the concepts and models in the text, see how they may apply to the situation (case) to most benefit the organization. Do not wait to do all the writing during the last few days before the deadline. So, the idea is — you learn and then you write (apply) the concepts/models to the case. If you do this week to week, writing the paper will be much more manageable.

Using the Training and & HRD Process Model (Figure 1-7 of text, page 27) as the roadmap, you are to develop a

Leadership Development training program

for the “mission critical” group which is part of the top 120 positions in M&M. Note the text has chapters providing detailed information about each phase of this model. Note that the text model is called ADiME (assessment, design, implementation {also includes development but not framed that way}, and evaluation), which folds in development as part of implementation. For the purposes of this paper, organize the paper around the ADDIE Model (Google it).

Also note that additional components (Coaching and Performance Management, etc.). These components are in addition to the ones provided in the author’s model (page 27). However the additional components added to the model below are included in other chapters of the text as well.

The grading rubric uses a slightly different model called ADDIE (assessment, design, development, implementation, and evaluation). So make sure that when you write your paper that you address the items in the ADDIE grading rubric!

As you write your paper, present the components in the order provided below/ next page. Headings are in bold and these must be included in your paper in the order displayed below. Additionally, APA formatting must be incorporated into the paper. In writing anything you must keep the readers in mind and write in such a way that the reader finds it easy to follow your writing without having to read 2-3 times in an effort to understand what you are trying communicate. You may use headings interspersed within and in addition to the headings (bold-below) that the paper requires.

After you write the introduction of your paper, you’ll need to include headers corresponding to the grading rubric – assessment, design, development, implementation, and evaluation. Certainly, you may have sub headers if that helps the organization of your paper. The statements below are from the grading rubric. You need to address these ADDIE Model phases as you develop a training program for M&M. These elements are listed below/ next page which include elements from the grading rubric.

General Outline

Assessment

Distinguishes current HRD gaps from systemic (non-HRD) gaps, anticipates HRD needs based on organizational strategy, and anticipates HRD needs due to changes in technology

Briefly tell how you would conduct an assessment. Then based on the case provide data from the case

Design your Proposed Solutions

For example … strategy, objectives, method (fitted to the training target—skill, knowledge, interpersonal competency, or experiential growth), materials, and media (classroom or technological.) Only use that which is applicable to your proposals.

How Will You Develop Your Solution (above)

Organizes content assets (developed in the design phase) to plan timely and logical delivery of all learning components with proper integration.

How Will You Implement Your Solution

Such as contractor versus in-house facilitator, type of facility, use of technology, equipment, materials, scheduling/sequencing, constraints, and pilot test if feasible.

How Will You Evaluate The Effectiveness of Your Solution

SUGGESTION: use the four Kirkpatrick levels—reactions, learning (retention), behavior (transfer), and organization-level results

Book Link :

VitalSource Bookshelf: Human Resource Development

9-412-147
REV: MAY 5, 2013
BORIS GROYSBERG
SARAH L. ABBOTT
A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic
Talent Management Initiatives
At the start of 2012, Maria Pejter, senior director of Maersk Group’s Human Resources
department, and Bill Allen, head of Human Resources (HR), sat down to consider some key aspects
of Maersk’s talent management strategy. Through 2008, Maersk had experienced several years of
rapid growth and strong profitability. The global recession in 2008 had negatively impacted both
Maersk’s top line and its returns; however, operating results had since improved, and Maersk earned
record profits in 2010. In recent years, Maersk had seen a rise in its unusually low historic employee
turnover rate. And Maersk had experienced a notable change in its corporate culture as it
transitioned from a family-owned Danish shipping company into a global, publicly-traded
conglomerate.
Allen and Pejter were evaluating Maersk’s talent management priorities in the context of the
increasingly competitive and fast-moving talent market of the 21st century. As Maersk continued to
grow, finding, developing, and retaining high-quality talent was becoming a bigger challenge. In
particular, Maersk was experiencing five notable talent challenges.
The first of these was increased employee turnover. Maersk had traditionally relied heavily on
employees who started with the Group as trainees and then spent the entirety of their careers there.
However, with competition in the labor market increasing, a greater number of Maersk employees
were leaving the Group for external opportunities. Maersk estimated that, of the approximately 400
trainees it brought on board each year, only 20% of them were still with the Group after five years. In
light of this rise in attrition, Maersk’s HR had increased its efforts to bring in experienced hires from
the outside. Allen and Pejter needed to better understand how much of a problem this higher
attrition rate was creating. How did it compare with what other firms were experiencing? And was it
possible that this higher turnover also provided an opportunity to bring in high-quality talent and to
further diversify the Group’s employee base?
The second challenge centered on what to do with Maersk’s training and development programs.
The training that Maersk had traditionally provided to its trainees was extensive, and included both
formal courses and on-the-job training, including rotational programs that allowed employees to
move across geographies and business units. This training was costly, but had been considered a
solid investment because many employees stayed with Maersk throughout their careers. However,
with employee attrition rates rising, and industry competitors targeting Maersk employees because of
their strong training, perhaps this strategy needed to be rethought. Additionally, as the need arose to
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Professor Boris Groysberg and Research Associate Sarah L. Abbott prepared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class
discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.
Copyright © 2012, 2013 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-5457685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu/educators. This publication may not be
digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.
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412-147
A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
hire more experienced individuals, should more emphasis be placed on the training needs of these
individuals? What other types of training should Maersk be offering its employees to ensure they
were well equipped to meet the business challenges of the 21st century?
Third, should Maersk continue to hire experienced individuals from outside the firm? In recent
years, the percentage of senior positions filled by external hires had increased from virtually none to
30%. What were the pros and cons associated with hiring from outside? How should Maersk think
about integrating these external hires? Feedback on Maersk’s integration efforts to date had not been
positive. Was it Maersk’s responsibility to integrate these senior hires, or was it a matter of hiring the
type of people who understood what it took to be successful in an environment like the one at
Maersk? Many companies practiced “natural integration.” What practices should Maersk put in place
to integrate experienced hires, if any?
Fourth, one way of bringing in external talent, while potentially reducing the associated
integration risk, was by rehiring former Maersk employees (“boomerangs”). While Maersk had no
formal policy on rehiring, it had historically been considered taboo. However, given Maersk’s
significant talent needs, Maersk had reversed its position on this policy a few years back. Pejter and
Allen planned to look at how this policy was working and determine whether or not the change had
been a good one for the Group. Should it rehire former employees? If so, under what conditions?
And, at what level should they be brought in?
Finally, Maersk was becoming a more diverse company with a more diverse customer base, and
was operating in an increasingly diverse business environment. In light of this, how did Maersk build
an inclusive culture? Did one already exist? Or was it something they needed to continue to work on?
A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Company Background
The A.P. Møller – Maersk Group (“Maersk” or “the Group”) was founded as a shipping company
in 1904 by Arnold Peter Møller and his father, Captain Peter Maersk Møller. Arnold Peter Møller
served as CEO of Maersk until his death in 1965. He was succeeded by his son, Maersk Mc-Kinney
Møller, who served as CEO until 1993 and chairman of the board until 2003. In 1993, Jess Søderberg,
who had been with the Group since 1969, became CEO, but resigned in 2007 after a rumored clash
with Mc-Kinney Møller.1 He was replaced by Nils S. Andersen, an external hire who had been with
Carlsberg A/S for over 20 years—most recently as president and CEO—but had served on Maersk’s
board of directors since 2005.
Headquartered in Copenhagen, by 2012, Maersk was the largest company in Denmark, and
operated in 130 countries with nearly 110,000 employees. Maersk comprised over 1,000 companies,
and operated one of the largest container shipping businesses globally as well as oil and gas
exploration and container terminals operations. Additionally, Maersk held a 68% stake in Dansk
Supermarket Group and a 20% interest in Danske Bank.
Maersk’s businesses included:
ï‚·
Maersk’s container services businesses—Maersk Line, Safmarine, MCC Transport, and Seago
Line—which contributed 40% of Maersk’s revenues. These operations consisted of 645 owned
and chartered vessels with aggregate capacity of 2.5 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU).
ï‚·
Maersk Oil, Maersk’s oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) operations, which
contributed 20% of revenues. Maersk had E&P operations in the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Qatar, and Algeria.
2
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A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
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ï‚·
APM Terminals, which owned and operated container terminals globally and contributed 7%
of revenues. Its network included 55 container terminals and 154 inland facilities in 64
countries.
ï‚·
Maersk Drilling, offshore drilling and land rig operations (including a 40% interest in
Egyptian Drilling Company), which contributed 3% of revenues.
ï‚·
Other businesses: Maersk Supply Service (anchor handling and platform supply vessels);
Maersk Tankers (oil and gas tanker shipping); Damco (logistics); Svitzer (towing and salvage
operations); Maersk FPSOs (serviced floating oil and gas producers via its fleet of three
floating production, storage, and offloading units (FPSOs), one floating gas storage offloading
unit (FGSO), and one jack-up production module) and Maersk LNG (owned and operated
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers).
2002–2008 saw strong growth globally for the container shipping industry, driven in part by the
expansion of outsourcing, growth in emerging markets, and China’s entrance into the World Trade
Organization in 2001. Maersk’s other businesses also experienced robust growth, resulting in a 15%
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) in group revenues, and a 14% CAGR in both EBITDA1 and
assets over this time period.
However, in 2008, the global recession resulted in slower growth across many of Maersk’s
business lines. In subsequent years, container industry volumes were relatively flat, and with
significant overcapacity, rates remained soft. In light of this environment, Maersk focused on
expansion in growth markets, such as Asia and Africa, and on cost control and improved efficiency in
mature markets. One business which remained a growth area was energy, with rising oil prices
driving strong top-line growth. Maersk produced 333,000 barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) per day in
2011 and had a strategic goal of producing 400,000 BOE per day.
As of December 31, 2011, Maersk’s total market capitalization was $28 billion (in U.S. dollars). The
company had been publicly traded since 1982, and was listed on the NASDAQ OMX Nordic
exchange. Maersk had two classes of shares: A shares, which possessed voting rights, and B shares,
which had no voting rights. As of December 31, 2011, Maersk’s share capital consisted of 4,395,600
shares, 50% of which were A shares and 50% of which were B shares. The Møller family’s foundation
controlled 41.22% of the share capital and 50.6% of the total votes. (Through other entities and private
ownership, the Møller family controlled an additional 25.9% of the voting power of Maersk.) Fortyone percent of the share capital was freely floated. (See Exhibit 1 for share price data for Maersk, and
Exhibits 2 and 3 for detailed financial performance data.)
Talent Management at Maersk
Talent Management in the Pre-2003 Era
The evolution of Maersk’s talent-management practices can be viewed in light of the company’s
overall evolution and growth. As Maersk transitioned from a family-owned Danish company to a
publicly-traded global conglomerate, its work force changed, as did its talent needs and practices.
Many of these changes also reflected trends in the broader market, as talent became increasingly
mobile.
1 Earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation and amortization.
3
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412-147
A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
Pejter described the workforce culture that had traditionally dominated Maersk: “In many ways,
A.P. Møller has been a company of people who work there for life … We have disproportionately
many people who get to their 40-year anniversary or 50-year anniversary with the company, and no
one makes a big wahoo out of 25-year anniversaries because they are very common.” She added that,
due in part to the presence of a strong founding family, Maersk employees felt they were part of
something that was more of a “familial relationship.”
Maersk had historically focused on hiring and training young, inexperienced individuals. It was
not uncommon to hire individuals directly from high school. Maersk’s two-year training program
entailed on-the job-training and formal coursework. Successful trainees were guaranteed an overseas
placement as part of their ongoing training. Individuals were hired by the Group, and moved
regularly across Maersk’s business lines.
In keeping with Maersk’s familial culture, managers were often slow to let go of underperforming
employees.
What emerged as a result of these practices was a strong, arguably homogenous and companyfocused, culture. Bill Allen described the culture at Maersk as “an insular organization, internally
focused, quite successful, very successful when it came to Denmark, quite successful globally, a big
headquarters, slow moving, bureaucratic. [There were] lots of control mechanisms in headquarters
indicative of a control culture.” He added, “In terms of things we were doing well—good focus on
leadership, good focus on values, and appreciation for the heritage of the organization, [there was] a
passion, a tremendous passion, about the industry, or industries that we were in, and a good
foundation, if you will. Smart, competitive people. It’s got a lot to [do with] our selection procedures
over the years.”
Jesper Madsen, a vice president in HR at Maersk Drilling, argued that while Maersk was good at
filling the firm’s needs, it was less good at focusing on the needs of its individual employees. He
explained, “But where we’re not doing well enough is on leveraging the talent of each individual. I
think we have a number of employees in our organization that are not the best version of
themselves—that we could actually benefit from engaging more in their personal development. So,
the individual career management—career development, personal aspiration development—I think
that’s the area where we are underleveraging for the time being.”
Rolf Habben-Jansen, CEO of Maersk’s Damco unit, posited that the homogenous nature of
Maersk’s employee base could present challenges. He argued, “The DNA of many of our people [is
similar]—they have been selected in the past based on certain personality profiles that are very, very
similar. And I’m a firm believer in the need to have some diversity also in terms of personality
because suddenly when you hit more turbulent times, it sometimes just helps to have some people
that don’t always go with the flow because they can help you challenge the conventional wisdom.”
And, he continued, “Because we had basically grown up all the management executives the same
way, that’s how we ended up with a leadership team with too similar beliefs, which is not ideal for
running a truly global and very diverse business.” Bill Allen concurred, arguing that traditionally
Maersk employees “knew how the organization worked. They were very, very, very good
operationally. They got things done, [and were] very execution-focused. But on the other hand, they
really didn’t have an external focus, because they hadn’t been brought up that way. They were
probably more operationally predisposed than they were commercially predisposed.”
According to Maersk employees, key personality traits that historically characterized successful
employees included “an enormous willingness to help other people” in the organization and an
4
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A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
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ability to build relations. “People that are able to adjust fast, and that don’t need directions all the
time” have also traditionally thrived at Maersk. Intellect, a focus on execution, and being a team
player were itemized by many as critical to success at Maersk. Also, an “ability to work within a
fairly loose framework, and get comfortable with that is very important, because you will be given a
lot of responsibility fast.”
Talent Management, 2003–2008
As Maersk expanded, its growth impacted both Maersk’s talent management practices and
processes, and its culture. To support its growth, the Group needed more experienced personnel and
managers. To fill these needs, it focused on both hiring experienced professionals and accelerating the
career progression of trainees.
Maersk’s growth also impacted the amount of interaction between business lines. Hiring and
training became business-line rather than Group functions; and rotational training programs focused
on rotations within rather than across Maersk’s business lines. Together, these changes impacted the
employee culture. As Pejter said, “when your company grows that fast, then the relationship between
the management and those employees at the end of the chain changes as well.”
Maersk also implemented more performance measurement standards, and letting go of
underperforming employees became more commonplace. As Jorn Madsen, a senior executive with
Maersk Oil, argued, ”I think that for many years some people would say that we have been conflictavoidant. Conflict handling is something that we’ve not been very good at—having the difficult
conversations, getting rid of people. It has to do with [the fact] that we spent so much time on getting
them in, and therefore it often more reflects on the managers when they have to let a person go—why
are you not able to get this person to work? But I think, in general, we have become much better at
that. We also have become much better at saying, ’Well, you probably don’t fit in here anymore. You
need to find yourself another place to be.’”
At the same time, Maersk was becoming increasingly global, in both its business and its employee
base.
In 2003, Mc-Kinney Møller, who was chairman at the time, sat down with the top 50 managers at
Maersk for a discussion about the key company values. Mc-Kinney Møller set forth his views on
these values, setting the tone for the discussion that followed. That discussion led to a company-wide
rollout—in many ways interactive and collaborative—of Maersk’s key corporate values. As part of
this rollout, Pejter said, it became apparent that “some of the things that had been going on in terms
of leadership and management in the organization were not actually quite in keeping with our
values.” As a result, Maersk made a number of senior management changes.
Talent Management, 2008–2012
In 2008, Allen was named head of Group HR to help transition the HR function from
administrative to strategic, and to position the company for the 21st century. Under Allen, the
decision was made to delegate operational responsibilities to the business unit levels. Headcount in
Group HR was reduced from 87 to 24 (and all but one of the 24 were new hires). The revamped
group had three key priorities. As Allen described, “Today, we have 24 people, and we focus on just
essentially three, arguably four, areas. Number one is getting the right people in the right jobs at the
right time for our top 1,000 employees. Number two is leadership development [because it] drives
5
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412-147
A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
business results. Number three is differentiation in terms of rewards and pay for performance.
Inherent in all that is performance management.”
Under Allen’s leadership, Group HR implemented a new talent-management process. The talent
management process consisted of five components: attraction, identification, development,
deployment, and scenario planning.
Attraction The first piece of the talent-management process was “attraction,” the process of
bringing the right people into the Group. Under the newly restructured HR department, this was
largely the responsibility of the business-unit HR departments.
Identification
The second component of the process was “identification,” represented by
People Strategy Sessions (PSS). For Group HR, the talent-management year began in January with the
PSS, which was a discussion between Maersk’s six-member executive board and the head of HR,
focusing on the top 120 positions in the company. As part of this review, they considered the firm’s
major needs and, as a result, the required capabilities of its talent. They looked at these needs in the
context of the Group’s five-year business plan and how it might impact any changes to these
requirements. For example, was a large acquisition being considered that might put a strain on
existing resources? Were changes in HR needed in light of a recent accident in one of Maersk’s
business lines?
The top 120 positions were then labeled as mission critical (30%), impactful (60%), and less
impactful (10%). In sorting the positions this way, they made careful comparisons across business
units so that not just the importance of a particular position within a unit was considered, but also the
relative importance of that unit within Maersk as a whole. For example, the CFO of Maersk’s biggest
unit might be considered alongside the CEO of a smaller business unit.
Next, the board and head of HR reviewed the individuals in these top 120 positions. The
reviewers asked, “Who are the people who have performed outstandingly? How have they done it?
Is that performance sustainable?” Employees were categorized as high performers (30%), successful
(60%), and less successful (10%).
Finally, the two reviews were lined up side by side so that management could evaluate whether
the Group’s best people were in the most important positions. As Pejter noted, the reviewers would
ask of each mission-critical position, “If this position is done optimally, what impact would that have
on the organization?”
From the PSS, management and HR emerged with an action plan. The PSS allowed them to
identify (and prioritize) talent gaps in the organization and to come up with a basic action plan. What
needed to be done? Was it a training need? Did an employee need to be moved? Should they bring
someone in from the outside?
The first PSS was held in January 2009, and Pejter recalled, “In the first year, we had a lot of action
plans but that number has been decreasing.” Pejter also noted that the PSS became increasingly more
productive as managers prepared more thoroughly and became more familiar with the key positions
and the people in them.
A PSS was also conducted in each of the major business units, with the management team of each
unit reviewing their top 75-100 positions. Each business unit adapted the PSS process slightly to fit its
own needs. As Pejter explained, “The core of the process remains the same, but different business
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A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
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units use it differently . . . give it a different flavor.” For example, at Damco a key client was invited to
participate in the PSS process.
The PSS was also integrated into the global compensation system for senior leaders, with an
individual’s PSS rating functioning as a cap on what that person could earn as an annual bonus.
Bonus numbers were based on Group or business unit performance and personal performance,
which was based on both what results were achieved and how they were achieved. “High
performers” were entitled to the maximum bonus. “Successful” employees were entitled to a payout
of up to 50% of the maximum, and “Less effective” employees could earn only 25% of this maximum
number. Pejter recalled that in 2010, with extremely strong Group business results, PSS ratings were
an important factor.
After experiencing three cycles of this process, Pejter noted that the link between the PSS rating
and the annual short-term incentive strongly reinforced the company’s commitment to reward
performance and drive the talent-management strategy.
Development The third part of the Group talent management process was development—
and much of that stemmed from the action plans of the PSS. In recent years, broad universal training
programs were replaced with more individual training and development. Additionally, while
traditionally training efforts had been focused almost exclusively on trainees, a greater emphasis was
now placed on the training needs of experienced employees.
Deployment
The fourth part of the talent management process was deployment. Maersk
replaced its focus on meeting talent needs internally with a more balanced strategy. By 2012, 70% of
executives were internally developed while the remaining 30% had been brought in from outside the
Group. For external hires, the benchmark was whether the person could be a high performer within
two PSS cycles. For each vacant position, HR reviewed the candidate list and asked, “These are the
best we have, but are they also the best we can get?” Maersk had also come to utilize partnerships
with external consultants in areas where management felt they didn’t necessarily need the skill-set
internally (for example, partner with a third party on an IT project). This was a big change for
Maersk, as historically management felt strongly about keeping all expertise in-house.
With respect to deployment of internal resources, one area of focus for HR was “talent
intimacy”—understanding not only which individuals were qualified to do a particular job, but also
which were willing to do it. Is the candidate willing to relocate? What family and personal
commitments might prevent them from accepting a new position?
Scenario planning Finally, scenario planning was the last piece of the talent management
process. Historically, HR had regularly updated a detailed succession plan for key positions.
However, when Allen joined Group HR, they realized that these plans had not proved particularly
useful. They stopped working on new plans for a couple of years, and then, in 2010, piloted “scenario
planning.” This involved looking at a five-year plan for each unit and assessing the unit’s major
people needs going forward. Was this a growth business? Would they be making acquisitions?
Selling off business lines? HR also put in place more formal succession plans for approximately 12
senior, high-risk positions. These positions included the six executive board members, and six other
positions that the board deemed as high risk. (Some of these cases were based more on the individual
than the position. For example, if the board was aware a senior employee was thinking of leaving the
Group, the position was considered high risk.)
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A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
Measuring performance Employees with Maersk have argued that post-2008 there was an
increased emphasis on performance measurement and standardized benchmarks. As Michael Chang
Bjornlund, an employee with Maersk Line’s Network & Products division, explained, “before, we
were smaller, we were less structured, and we were all about just doing business, everybody looking
at their own piece of the puzzle and doing the right thing themselves.“ He continued that today,
“Maersk Line is incredibly driven by objective settings and key performance indicators (KPIs) and
schemes that dictate behavior.” Morten Wedel Jørgensen, an employee with Maersk Oil, concurred,
stating, Maersk “has become more performance focused … more focused on accountability for the
part of business you’re in—there is more transparency around who is responsible for what, exactly. “
The widespread implementation of benchmarking made it more difficult for underperforming
employees to last at Maersk. Jørgensen posited, “So I think [for] people who don’t perform, it’s
clearer to see how not performing will influence your career here. So, for example, people around me
who do not perform, it’s clearer to see how they are then given some short-term objectives to fulfill,
and if they can’t do that then they will have to leave. I think that process has become much clearer,
whereas before there was at least a perceived tendency that even if you didn’t perform, once you
were here you could stay here for a long time.”
However, many argued that the use of formalized benchmarks also had its costs. Bjornlund
argued that “very rigid KPI structures don’t really encourage cross-functional collaboration.” He
added, “And I know it’s one of the downsides of objective setting like that. The upside is of course it
makes people know exactly what they need to do, and there’s no doubt about what you’re being
rewarded on, but I think it’s come to the point where we tend to forget the end-to-end picture, the
holistic picture of our business, and we’ve become too focused on our own turf.”
Talent Management Challenges
Retention
The first issue that Allen and Pejter needed to discuss was the increase in Maersk’s historically
low employee turnover rate. Turnover was rising across business lines but was particularly worrying
in some areas. For example, of the 400 trainees, from 80 countries, hired per year, only 20% of them
were still with the Group after five years. Also, Maersk’s energy businesses had seen a notable uptick
in attrition—annual voluntary attrition rates in Maersk Drilling had recently risen from 1%-2% to 5%.
This rise in attrition, combined with rapid business growth, had resulted in sizable hiring needs.
As Jørgensen explained, “We’re hiring (a) because we’re a growing business, and (b) because the
attrition in the oil and gas industry is substantial.” And Karsten Breum, head of HR at Damco, added,
“We have had to attract a significant amount of people outside the group into Damco because we’ve
had a very limited pipeline.” While it was difficult to keep up with these hiring needs, Breum
commented that, on the plus side, “We’ve become a lot more diverse, we’ve become a lot more
dependent on people from other companies within the industry.”
Development
Hiring inexperienced individuals and providing them with training had historically been the
hallmark of Maersk’s recruitment program. Its hiring processes were extensive, and involved
numerous tests (including psychometric tests originally designed for U.S. fighter pilots2) and
multiple interviews, often with five to six Maersk employees. Maersk also created personality profiles
for all employees.
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The entry-level training program lasted two years. Individuals were hired straight from college or
high school. The program involved formal training modules as well as on-the-job training. During the
two years, trainees rotated through various functional groups. Additionally, many trainees opted to
pursue part-time studies in the evening at Copenhagen Business School. After the initial two years,
all trainees were guaranteed a two-year placement overseas.
Following the initial training and overseas placement, the Group provided its employees with the
flexibility to move around in the company and with other opportunities that encouraged employees
to stay with Maersk over the long term. As Jorn Madsen explained, “Maersk is very open to what you
would like to do with your career. There’s an opportunity to move horizontally into jobs that you
haven’t had before. In general, we look at people’s performance more than we look at their formal
backgrounds, and how well they perform in their jobs—most jobs you can learn. So, I think that’s
why I’ve stayed here so long. Because there has always been an opportunity to do something I
haven’t done before.”
In 2003–2004, Maersk began to look at a number of new training initiatives. In 2005–2006, it
launched a series of programs aimed at decreasing the time it took trainees to progress to the
executive band. At the time, it took 15–20 years on average, with the fastest movers taking 12 years.
The first of the new programs picked up a select number of employees as they came out of the trainee
program. The program lasted three years, and provided support for these employees as they
progressed to the general management level. After this, selected employees entered the Emerging
Leader program, which was designed to take employees from the general manager band of the
organization to the director band of the organization. And finally, the Executive Acceleration
program was designed to take the directors and catapult them into the executive band. The program
would include approximately 1% of employees, targeting the most promising. Pejter explained the
objective of these programs: “The success criteria that we put up for those programs were that they
would have to have an increased retention ratio for the people that were on the programs, compared
to the control group, and that secondly, the programs should support those people’s careers
accelerating at a faster pace than the control group.“
By 2008, with a new CEO and with Allen’s arrival as the new head of HR, the preliminary results
of this new training program were reviewed. Initial results showed above-average attrition rates for
program participants, and so, given the costs, the lack of a return on their investment, and shifting
HR priorities, the program was closed down.
Under Allen, there was a shift in Maersk’s internal training to emphasize leadership development.
Allen elaborated: “One of the things we decided that we would be involved in is training that
supports what we expect of our leaders. We expect three things of our leaders. One is to deliver the
results. Two is to be a good and inspiring leader. Three is to live the values of the organization.” He
added, “The piece around being a good and inspiring leader is really the piece that our leadership
training focuses on. That’s basically all we do from a leadership development standpoint, because …
You essentially cannot be a successful business leader, if you can’t be a successful people leader.”
Pejter noted that Maersk changed the design and focus of executive training; it was no longer viewed
as a reward to be given to high-performing employees. Instead, the view was that “it should be given
to people who need it to perform better in their jobs, instead of a bonus.”
The idea of individualized, need-based employee training had become popular with a wide range
of firms in recent years. Many firms embraced this concept alongside pay-for-performance initiatives,
with highly ranked employees who exceeded performance targets eligible for bonuses, while lowerperforming employees were let go, moved to new positions, or provided with training to help
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improve their performance. TIAA-CREF, for example, introduced a new performance evaluation
system in the 2000s whereby employees were ranked on a scale of 1–5. Employees with top scores
under this system were entitled to a bonus and a merit increase of 5%, while employees with lower
scores were reviewed by their managers to determine if they were in the right position or if they
needed additional training.3
Maersk HR also believed that some training was best done on an individualized basis, rather than
in a broad training program. And here, again, the concept of talent intimacy was stressed. Managers
focused on getting to know their employees such that they could understand not only what each
employee’s needs were, but how that employee learned best.
HR created a “Development Shop”—an online depository for training and learning resources.
This included materials from 250 business schools globally, and covered such areas as financial
acumen, strategic leadership, and self-leadership. Training offerings consisted of traditional
classroom learning, e-learning, and business articles. Everyone in the firm was given access to the
articles and other free materials. All courses required approval, with online courses generally
restricted to the top 2,000 employees and classroom courses to the top 300 employees. HR found that
some executives wanted to “self-service” their development needs; these individuals focused on
online learning options. Others preferred learning with their team or via classes.
Integrating Experienced Hires
As discussed, the hiring of experienced outside individuals had become an increasingly important
piece of Maersk’s HR strategy. Allen and Pejter contemplated the pros and cons of this strategy. Was
this a positive for the company or should they be making more efforts to develop and retain homegrown talent?
There was also a growing sentiment among many within Maersk that bringing in outsiders was
good for the organization. As Pejter commented, relying solely on internal talent could result in a
“lack of fresh eyes and energy.” Internally, Maersk referred to this new, balanced talent development
approach as “build, buy, or borrow.” Jesper Madsen commented that “what we have done from an
organizational point of view is instead of focusing only on building from inside, it’s now a strategy
where we build, and we also buy, from the outside … it’s a strategy of a more mixed approach than
what we used to have, say, ten years ago.”
However, many believed that Maersk did not do enough to support these hires, and that Maersk’s
strong and cohesive culture made it difficult for experienced hires to succeed. Jorn Madsen observed,
“We have just, in our business unit, taken on some fairly senior people. It takes a long time for them
to fit in. The culture is difficult to get into, because most of us have grown up with it, so we know all
the dos and don’ts. We know how to get things done and how to make allies and how not to make
enemies and how to get your projects through the systems and get traction.” Madsen continued,
“There are extensive programs for junior hires, but nothing in the way of training or coaching for
experienced hires.” Jørgensen concurred, explaining, “There is a graduate program for technical
graduates … But for me coming in as an experienced hire on a different career track, there isn’t any.”
Bjornlund, a boomerang hire in Maersk Line, had a similar experience.
When I came back, it was part of a deliberate action to bring in new blood from outside …
we do have a lunch every month, with the six other guys that were hired under those terms, so
to speak. And I can tell that that’s one of the things they found difficult. So they hadn’t been in
the company before, and they felt that it has been a little bit difficult to establish themselves in
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terms of getting to know people, because knowing people is often . . . a prerequisite for getting
things done, and it can be hard to maneuver if you don’t know people.
The Practice of Re-Hiring
While rehiring former employees was not a new phenomenon, it had received increased attention
in recent years. In a 2010 survey by OI Partners-Career Management Resources of Atlanta, 50% of
employers reported that they planned to hire former employees.4 And, John Sullivan, a San
Francisco-based human resources adviser, estimated that up to 10% of new hires at many companies
were boomerang employees.5 In some firms this number was even higher. For example, according to
Karen Wensley, Ernst & Young’s HR manager in Toronto, 15%–20% of that firm’s hires each year
were previous employees.6
In some instances, boomerangs had left the firm voluntarily, while in other cases, they had been
laid off as part of a downsizing. The length of time that employees were away from a firm before
returning also varied, but according to a study of 450 boomerangs by Abbie Shipp at Texas A&M,
nearly seven of the 10 rehires returned to their firm within three years.7
Many employers argued that, in the right circumstances, a boomerang could be lower risk and
less costly than other hires. Given that the employee was known to the firm, the hiring and recruiting
processes could be shorter and less labor-intensive. These employees were often also quicker to get
up to speed, reducing initial training costs. The talent recruitment firm Hudson did a survey of 1,046
employers, and nine out of 10 of them ranked the boomerangs in their firm as “above average”
performers.8 Boomerangs were also believed to have higher retention rates; they had a clear sense of
what they were getting into when they joined the firm.
Given this, many firms, particularly in the services sector, sought out former employees as a
source of new hires. A study by Cranfield School of Management found that 25% of private sector
firms actively pursued boomerang hires.9
As part of this effort, firms had set up alumni networks to allow for ongoing communications
with former employees, keeping them up to date with changes and new opportunities at the firm.
McKinsey & Company began organizing activities for former employees as far back as the 1960s.
Credit Suisse Group AG launched the Credit Suisse Alumni Network in October 2010. Ernst &
Young, Deloitte, Booz Allen Hamilton, and IBM had also set up initiatives to keep in touch with
former employees. As of 2008, IBM’s alumni network comprised approximately 38,000 former
employees. Ethan McCarty, who managed alumni relations for IBM, explained the rationale behind
the network: ”It just makes sense for companies, especially in the services landscape, to keep in touch
with alumni because hiring back formers is a cultural, financial, and productivity advantage.” He
added, “”IBM’s business has changed radically in the last five years to the tune of billions of dollars
… People come and go out of IBM all the time. It’s important to us to keep alumni abreast of all kinds
of opportunities and skills that come up.”10 In 2012, Booz Allen Hamilton’s company website read,
“It’s always our goal to retain our best employees. The reality is, great people do leave the firm for a
variety of reasons. It’s also true for Booz Allen Hamilton that many who resign end up coming back.
It’s such a frequent occurrence, we’ve dubbed this special group Comeback Kids.”11 Likewise, Craig
Roskos, managing partner of Ernst & Young’s Winnipeg office, explained, “We welcome the
opportunity to have alumni return to our organization, as they understand our processes and culture
and because they’ve stayed in contact with people here, they’re already well-connected.”12 Neal
Wendel, a Credit Suisse managing director, concurred, stating, “We know them, and they know us.”13
11
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And, from the perspective of the boomerang employee, returning to a previous firm could have
simply been a matter of coincidence—it happened to be where the best opportunity was—or it could
have been a case of actively seeking to return to one’s prior firm. Cecilia Atkinson, general manager
of Celestial Seasonings, a tea company at which 11% of employees were boomerangs, argued that her
firm’s boomerang phenomenon was largely a function of the latter. “Celestial Seasonings has been
ranked as one of the best places to work in Colorado and in our corporate culture, employees feel as
much like family as coworkers. Our high number of long-term and boomerang employees speaks to
our dynamic and caring environment.”14
Historically, Maersk had an unwritten but widely upheld policy of not rehiring former employees
under any circumstances. As one employee recalled, “In the old days, it was a bit like—they
abandoned ship, and they could never return, because it was borderline treason that you did that
before your retirement age.” Jesper Madsen (a VP in HR at Maersk Drilling) concurred, stating, “If
you go 10 years back, this was a family-owned business with a very traditional mindset in terms of
coming to work at this company. It was sort of seen as joining a family, entering a marriage, and if
you broke that bond, then you were not welcome back.”
In the 2000s, in connection with the strategic corporate redirection, HR began to question the
wisdom of the policy of not rehiring former employees. Hiring needs were increasing, and the
decision was made to reverse this policy and to consider returning applicants on an opportunistic
basis. As Pejter recalled,
[The no-rehire policy] was really limiting some of the opportunities to get the best people in
the market, because some of the best people within our industry had at some point worked
within…And where we, perhaps, could see that they left the company because we didn’t have
the right job opportunities for them at the time, it somehow felt like a little bit of a waste to not
bring them back in when you knew that they understood the company culture, and they
hadn’t left for performance reasons, and they hadn’t gone to competitors.
Jesper Madsen attributed the reversal of this policy to the changing culture at Maersk:
I think we have grown out of the family-oriented type of business culture into a more
performance-driven culture where it’s not really about engaging into that marriage type of
relationship with a company, but it’s about making a contract where you agree that as an
employer, we would like to get you in. And as an employee, I would like to get in, and offer
my services for a period of time, and perhaps some time down the road, I want to try
something else, but if I’ve been a good performer, I can certainly come back. So I think that the
rationale behind that change should be seen as a change—or at least a modification—of our
DNA.
Allen explained: “What we said is that if there are people that have been successful in the
organization, they left for the right reasons—they didn’t leave us in a lurch, they didn’t disparage the
company on their way out—and they were truly high performers, then we ought to rehire them.“
Pejter and other HR personnel sat down with the business-line heads to let them know that they
should consider rehires where appropriate. Before rehiring a former employee, HR, as a rule, checked
with their old unit to ensure that the employee had left on good terms.
Because of the heavy geographic rotation of employees within Maersk, having people move in
and out of groups was not uncommon. Maersk employees tended to return to the Group at their
“peer level,” where they would have been had they remained with Maersk. While no statistics were
kept on the number of rehires, HR believed that they were occurring across all business lines.
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Returning employees also spoke positively about their experience with Maersk. One employee,
who left Maersk Line to do an MBA and subsequently spent several years with a strategic-consulting
firm, explained that he returned to Maersk because of an attractive opportunity in their oil and gas
business. He believed that there were benefits to being a boomerang, noting that there were “some
advantages in having a network already, and also understanding some of the other businesses that
[Maersk was in]. I think that has been actually quite a big advantage, especially in dealing with
Group level functions.” Likewise, Bjornlund argued, “It was definitely easier because I knew people,
even though I had only been here for four years and it had been quite a while since I was here. I knew
people here, there, and everywhere, basically. “
Building an Inclusive Culture
With a Danish founding family, which continued to own a majority stake, and its position as
Denmark’s largest company, Maersk had traditionally been very much a Danish company. Breum
observed, “Our mentality was Danish, our way of thinking was Danish, our leadership team was
Danish, our talent programs were only Danes, our trainee program was only Danes.”
However, in recent years, that had begun to change, and as Maersk grew larger and more
globalized with respect to its business operations and its customer base, its employee base and its
corporate culture began to reflect more diversity. Breum commented that this trend was first evident
in the trainee program:
Our trainee program grew to become a lot more international gradually and that, I think,
was a significant vehicle for changing the entire mindset in the company, also at the leadership
level. But these things take time, and all of a sudden we now speak English in any meeting that
you attend. At the coffee machine and the canteen you speak English because you know there
are international colleagues around you, and we have become much more focused on hiring
and on developing and retaining a much more diverse talent core.
With expansion efforts focused largely on developing markets such as Asia and Africa, and with
significant and growing hiring needs, Allen and Pejter realized that building a corporate culture that
would allow them to attract and retain talent from all over the globe was of paramount importance.
The HR-Customer Initiative at Maersk
In 2009, Maersk Logistics, Maersk’s supply-chain management business, and Damco, its global
freight and ocean-forwarding operations, were separated from Maersk Line to form their own
business unit, branded under the Damco name. Jeremy T. Haycock, president of Maersk Logistics
USA, said of this move, “The liner shipping and logistics and forwarding business models are very
different, and it has become too complex to run the two as an integrated business.”15
Maersk’s management hoped that by splitting the businesses, Damco would be better positioned
to conduct business with other shipping companies. At the time of the split, 70%–80% of Damco’s
business was with Maersk. However, by the end of 2009, this number had declined to less than 50%,
as Damco built up its relationships with other shipping companies. Separating the two businesses
allowed Damco to offer customers a “carrier-neutral solution.”16 In 2009, Damco hired a new CEO,
Rolf Habben-Jansen, who joined Damco from DHL, where he had served as CEO of DHL Global
Customer Solutions. By 2012, Damco had over 10,800 employees globally. Damco employees
13
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managed the logistics for more than 2.5 million TEU of ocean freight, and 110,000 tons of air freight
annually. 2011 revenues totaled $2.8 billion, and Damco generated $97 million of EBIT.2
In 2010, Damco executives met to consider ways to improve their relationships with corporate
clients. As Breum explained, “Like many other businesses, of course we would like to believe that we
are customer-centric, and I think a lot of businesses talk about it. The question is what exactly does it
mean, and what does it mean from an HR point of view?” From these discussions came the idea to
open up Damco’s PSS (People Strategy Sessions) to its best customers.
Breum described Damco’s approach to the People Strategy Sessions, which was in many ways
similar to the approach taken by the Group: “We look at the top 120 positions in the organization,
and then we go through a review of these positions, and we rank them as mission critical, critical, less
impactful.” This review was based on Damco’s three to five-year corporate strategy, and once the
positions were reviewed, the people in those positions were assessed. Breum and other senior
managers would rank them as
high performers, successful performers, and less successful performers, and then we look at
different combinations. So we look at our mission-critical positions and we look at the people
that we have in those roles but … ideally we would like to see that in these mission-critical
positions we have high performers in almost all of them.
Damco began by opening up its PSS to one of its largest customers in late 2010. At the time,
Damco provided a large percentage of this client’s supply-chain management needs, and 70–75
Damco employees worked exclusively on this account. The client’s primary concern was “to make
sure that their operations from a supply-chain management point of view run smoothly and
effectively.” To help assure the client that Damco had the appropriate resources to best serve their
needs, and to allow them to have input into the hiring, promotion, and development of those
employees working on their account, Damco invited the client to participate in a PSS. As Breum
explained,
The rollout started in a regularly scheduled review with the client. The client asked, “Did
we have a contingency plan, did we have a succession plan?” And we then said, why don’t we
take this a step further, and then actually go through our team and identify what are the key
roles where you really think we need to have a bench and a plan in place if something
happens, and then also review the current team together with you to understand where you
see the talent in our organization.
At the PSS, Damco managers discussed the key positions from the customer’s perspective. Were
the right people sitting in these jobs? What was the best way to develop and retain these people?
(And here the discussion was both general to the employee population overall and specific to each
key employee.) They looked at “bench strength”: “What happens if this individual resigns or if we
were to move this individual to another position in our organization? Do we have a back-up? Who
would back-fill that job, who would make sure that … there is continuity?”
Sanne Moller, a former Damco employee, argued that client involvement in the PSS was a very
successful initiative, stating that “the general impression that I get is that they [the client] are
extremely excited about the opportunity, at this way of interacting and being invited in and creating
a relationship.” She added that the client “[got] very serious about the strength of the team, the
people in our organization that work for them and, often, they know almost more about these
2 Earnings before interest and taxes.
14
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individuals and their performance [than we do] … the interesting part here is also that it becomes a
little bit of a gray zone [as to] who is actually your employer.”
Moller argued that the biggest challenge with respect to opening up the PSS was the “lack of
control and losing control because you put something that typically is very internal and place it …
outside the organization.” On the other hand, by bringing external people into the process, Damco
benefited from new and different perspectives and the result is often “high engagement from the
customer side.”
In addition to allowing one large client into its PSS, Damco managers also hosted large workshops
where business leaders sat down with clients and discussed major issues. Moller observed, “And
what I see in these sessions is you have 35–40 people in these workshops from all over the world …
what happens in the room, and I’ve seen it at three different workshops now, is that there is an
extremely high energy level and engagement from both sides and actual business opportunities being
discussed.” She added that the participant questions at the customer sessions are “typically very
oriented towards them [Damco’s clients]. How can we help you improve your business? What
matters to you? And from what you see in the presentation, and what the participants also realize, is
that … there are some similarities in what the customers emphasize, but also some differences.”
While these initiatives were designed and launched by Damco HR, they required full participation
of the business leaders. Should one client experiment be expanded to include other large Damco
clients?
Looking Forward
Pejter and Allen considered each of these HR challenges in turn: rising retention rates; changing
development needs, reflective of a changing workforce, along with a desire to better target training
resources; the hiring and integration of experienced personnel; the practice of rehiring former Maersk
employees—was it working? Or, did the practice need to be amended or abandoned altogether? And,
finally, building a more diverse and inclusive corporate culture, a culture that was in line with, and
support of Maersk’s overall business objectives.
Which strategies were likely to serve Maersk well as it focused on continued growth and
improved profitability? Which, if any, represented a waste of their valuable HR resources? Or were
there other areas on which HR should be focusing?
15
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A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
Exhibit 1a
Maersk: Five-Year Share Price Performance (Share Price in Danish Krone (DKK))
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
3/23/2007
4/26/2008
5/31/2009
7/5/2010
8/9/2011
Exhibit 1b Maersk: Five-Year Share Price Performance (Relative to OMX Copenhagen 20,
Indexed to 00%)
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
MAERSK B
40%
OMXC 20
20%
0%
Source:
Thomson Reuters.
16
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A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
Exhibit 2
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Maersk: Five-Year Financial Summary (USD in millions)
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
Revenue
$60,230
$56,090
$48,580
$61,270
$51,278
Profit before depreciation, amortization, and
impairment losses, etc. (EBITDA)
$14,661
$15,867
$9,193
$16,478
$11,919
Depreciation, amortisation, and impairment losses
$5,396
$6,015
$5,658
$5,122
$4,816
Gain on sale of non-current assets, etc., net
$887
$674
$159
$914
$1,113
Share of profit/loss in associated companies
$122
$82
$67
-$369
$566
$10,274
$10,608
$3,761
$11,901
$8,782
Financial items, net
-$852
-$936
-$980
-$1,533
-$755
Profit before tax
$9,422
$9,672
$2,781
$10,368
$8,027
Tax
$6,060
$4,655
$3,805
$6,927
$4,507
Profit/loss for the year–continuing operations
$3,362
$5,017
-$1,024
$3,441
$3,520
$15
$1
$0
$21
-$98
Profit/loss for the year
$3,377
$5,018
-$1,024
$3,462
$3,422
Total assets
$70,444
$66,756
$66,511
$64,925
$64,648
Total equity
$36,190
$34,376
$30,610
$29,972
$28,903
Cash flow from operating activities
$7,262
$10,132
$4,679
$8,524
$7,313
Cash flow used for capital expenditure
-$9,759
-$4,638
-$7,874
-$10,281
-$9,000
Investment in property, plant, and equipment
$7,804
$4,745
$7,867
$11,990
$10,652
Return on invested capital after tax (ROIC)
8.3%
12.2%
-0.3%
10.1%
10.1%
Return on equity after tax
9.6%
15.4%
-3.4%
11.8%
12.9%
Equity ratio
51.4%
51.5%
46.0%
46.2%
44.7%
Profit before financial items (EBIT)
Profit/loss for the year–discontinued operations
17
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A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
Exhibit 2 (continued)
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
Earnings per share (EPS)
$650
$1,078
-$312
$809
$795
Diluted earnings per share
$649
$1,077
-$312
$809
$795
$1,663
$2,321
$1,115
$2,072
$1,777
$174
$178
$63
$123
$128
Share price (B share), end of year
$6,600
$8,998
$7,052
$5,317
$10,719
Total market capitalisation, end of year
$28,018
$38,741
$30,231
$22,002
$43,973
Average USD/DKK exchange rate
5.35
5.62
5.36
5.09
5.44
End of year USD/DKK exchange rate
5.75
5.61
5.19
5.28
5.08
8.1
7.3
6.9
7.0
6.8
$2,828
$3,064
$2,370
$3,284
$3,034
$620
$458
$342
$520
$344
(thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day)
333
377
428
424
393
Average crude oil price (Brent) (USD per barrel)
$111
$80
$62
$97
$72
33.5
31.5
30.9
33.3
31.0
Cash flow from operating activities per share
Dividend per share
Maersk Line
Transported volumes (FFE in million)
Average rate (USD per FFE)
Average fuel price (USD per tonne)
Maersk Oil
Average share of oil and gas production
APM Terminals
Containers handled (million TEU weighted with
ownership share)
Source: A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S, Group Annual Report 2011, p. 11, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA3GG91Y/1747970336x0x547405/335d34dc-51c5-482c-bb8c-b3f3bcd3ddee/Group_Annual_Report_2011_UK.pdf,
accessed March 2012.
18
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A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
Exhibit 3a
412-147
Maersk: 2011 Financial Results by Business Segment (USD in millions)
Revenues
EBITDA
ROIC
2011
2010
2011
2010
2011
2010
Maersk Oil
$12,616
$10,250
$10,015
$8,268
36.3%
32.6%
APM Terminals
$4,682
$4,251
$1,059
$869
13.1%
16.0%
Maersk Drilling
$1,878
$1,627
$862
$748
12.7%
11.0%
Maersk Line
$25,108
$24,022
$1,009
$4,507
-3.4%
15.3%
Maersk Supply Service
$824
$15,122
$772
$15,168
$368
$1,348
$384
$1,091
11.3%
10.5%
N/A
N/A
Other / Unallocated
Exhibit 3b
Maersk: 2011 Financial Results by Business Segment
% of total Revenue
68.3%
% of total EBITDA
41.7%
25.1%
20.9%
7.8% 7.2%
Maersk Oil
3.1%
5.9%
APM Terminals Maersk Drilling
9.2%
6.9%
1.4% 2.5%
Maersk Line
Maersk Supply
Service
Other /
Unallocated
Source: A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S, Group Annual Report 2011, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA3GG91Y/1747970336x0x547405/335d34dc-51c5-482c-bb8c-b3f3bcd3ddee/Group_Annual_Report_2011_UK.pdf,
accessed March 2012.
19
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412-147
A.P. Møller – Maersk Group: Evaluating Strategic Talent Management Initiatives
Endnotes
1 “Danish businessman who created worldwide shipping, container and oil company dies,” http://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/industries/danish-businessman-who-created-worldwide-shipping-containergroup-dies/2012/04/16/gIQADQuxKT_story.html, accessed April 2012.
2 Robert Wright, “Founder’s son on course to step back from Maersk helm,” Financial Times, June 7, 2008, via
Factiva, accessed May 2012.
3 Jessica Marquez, “Raising the Performance Bar,” Workforce Management, April 24, 2006, via Factiva, accessed
May 2012.
4 Don Sadler, “Laid-off workers could get rehired: ‘Boomerang’ employees attractive to employers, according
to survey,” The Atlanta Journal – Constitution, March, 5, 2010, via Factiva, accessed April 2012.
5 “Boomerang employees fly back and smart firms welcome them and the new skills they acquired,”
Winnipeg Free Press, June 17, 2006, via Factiva, accessed April 2012.
6 Wallace Immen, “Prodigal employees find warm welcome back; As competition for talent heats up,
boomerang employees are increasingly valued,” The Globe and Mail, January 25, 2006, via Factiva, accessed April
2012.
7 Tammy Joyner, “For some, old job is better than new: Call it career boomerang: Recession fears have made
the rehiring of former employees advantageous for everyone involved,” The Atlanta Journal – Constitution, June 1,
2008, via Factiva, accessed April 2012.
8 David Maida, “Bring ‘boomerangs’ back to the fold,” The New Zealand Herald, June 4, 2011, via Factiva,
accessed April 2012.
9 Adeline Iziren, “Office Hours: Never say never again: If football managers can do it, why not you? Going
back to your old job has lost its stigma – and chances are your former firm will be pleased to have you back,” The
Guardian, December 12, 2005, via Factiva, accessed April 2012.
10 Joyner, “Call it career boomerang.”
11 Booz Allen website, http://www.boozallen.com/careers/find-your-job/former-booz-allen-employees,
accessed April 2012.
12 Dr. John McFerran, “May we be of service? Ernst & Young’s product is people,” Winnipeg Free Press, July 3,
2010, via Factiva, accessed April 2012.
13
Melissa Korn, “Managing & Careers: Boomerang Employees—More Companies Tap Into Alumni
Networks to Re-Recruit Best of Former Workers,” The Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2011, via Factiva, accessed
April 2012.
14
“Celestial Seasonings Celebrates 35 Flavorful Years! Long-Term and ‘Boomerang Employees’ Bring
Loyalty, Expertise to Tea Manufacturer,” PR Newswire (U.S.), October 6, 2005, via Factiva, accessed April 2012.
15 William Hoffman, “Maersk’s Logistics Relaunch,” Traffic World, January 21, 2008, via Factiva, accessed
April 2012.
16 Alan Field, “Damco spreads logistics umbrella,” Journal of Commerce, September 14, 2009, via Factiva,
accessed April 2012.
20
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800-988-0886 for additional copies.
The Assignment Outline – the
ADDIE Model Phases/ Elements
Assessment
Distinguishes current HRD gaps from systemic (non-HRD) gaps, anticipates HRD needs based
on organizational strategy, and anticipates HRD needs due to changes in technology
You are to briefly tell how you would conduct an assessment. Then based on the case
provide data from the case as well as “dummy” data you need to create to demonstrate
evidence of assessment (results). What did the assessment look like as well as your
interpretation of it. Address the italicized rubric statement above.
Define Purpose
Define Assessment Tools/Methods to Use
Collect and Compile Assessment Data – (if needed create dummy data for analysis)
Strategic/organizational
Task Analysis
Person Analysis
Anticipate HRD needs due to changes in technology
Provide Data Analysis & Conclusions/Prioritization
Identify system (non-HRD) issues that are preventing effective performance that cannot
be effectively addressed by training and development
interventions
Design
Defines strategy, objectives, method (fitted to the training target—skill, knowledge,
interpersonal competency, or experiential growth), materials, and media (classroom or
technological.) You need to address the italicized rubric statement above. You are to
have no more than 4 training objectives (Mager criteria).
Define Purpose/strategy
Write Training Objectives
Define Criteria for evaluation
Select Trainers (Criteria for selection)
Draft Lesson Plan (see text for example-p. 153; Figure 5-2)
Select Training Methods and Media (preliminary)
Draft Training Materials
Draft Schedule Program/course
Development
Organizes content assets (developed in the design phase) to plan timely and logical delivery of
all learning components with proper integration.
You need to address the italicized rubric statement above.
Implementation
Determines contractor versus in-house facilitator, type of facility, use of technology,
equipment, materials, scheduling/sequencing, constraints, and pilot test if feasible
Define Purpose
Decide Make or Buy: Justify
Select Instructional Methods for Training Delivery
Select Any On the Job Methods
Select Job Instruction Training
Select Classroom Instruction
Select Audiovisual Media
Select Computer Based Training (Classroom-Based)
Select Self-Paced/Computer-Based Training Media and Methods
Select Arrangements for the Physical Environment
Assurance of Learning & Case Analysis Rubrics
Case Analysis Rubric #2 (see next page)
The ADDIE model
The ADDIE model is a framework that lists generic processes that instructional designers
and training developers use.[1] It represents a guideline for building effective training and
performance support tools in five phases.
• Analysis
• Design
• Development
• Implementation
• Evaluation
ADDIE is an Instructional Systems Design (ISD) model. Most current ISD models are
variations of the ADDIE process.[2] Other models include the Dick & Carey and Kemp ISD
models. Rapid prototyping is a commonly accepted improvement to this model. This is the
idea of reviewing continual or formative feedback while creating instructional materials.
This model strives to save time and money by catching problems while they are still easy to
fix. This rapid prototyping is also called SAM, or successive approximation model.
Instructional theories also play an important role in the design of instructional materials.
Theories such as behaviorism, constructivism, social learning, and cognitivism help shape
and define the outcome of instructional materials.
History
Florida State University initially developed the ADDIE model to explain, “…the processes
involved in the formulation of an instructional systems development (ISD) program for military
interservice training that will adequately train individuals to do a particular job and which can
also be applied to any interservice curriculum development activity.”[3] The model originally
contained several steps under its five original phases (analyze, design, develop, implement, and
evaluate).[3] The idea was to complete each phase before moving to the next. Over the years,
practitioners revised the steps, and eventually the model became more dynamic and interactive
than the original hierarchical version. By the mid-1980s, the version familiar today appeared.[4]
ADDIE Model
Phases of ADDIE
Analysis phase
The analysis phase clarifies the instructional problems and objectives, and identifies the learning
environment and learner’s existing knowledge and skills. Questions the analysis phase addresses
include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Who are the learners and what are their characteristics?
What is the desired new behavior?
What types of learning constraints exist?
What are the delivery options?
What are the pedagogical considerations?
What adult learning theory considerations apply?
What is the timeline for project completion?
Design phase
The design phase deals with learning objectives, assessment instruments, exercises, content,
subject matter analysis, lesson planning, and media selection. The design phase should be
systematic and specific. Systematic means a logical, orderly method of identifying, developing
and evaluating a set of planned strategies targeted for attaining the project’s goals. Specific means
each element of the instructional design plan must be executed with attention to details.
In the design phase, developers:
•
•
•
•
•
Document the instructional, visual, and technical design strategy
Apply instructional strategies according to intended behavioral outcomes by domain
(cognitive, affective, and psychomotor)
Design the user interface and user experience
Create a prototype
Apply visual design (graphic design)
Development phase
In the development phase, instructional designers and developers create and assemble content
assets blueprinted in the design phase. In this phase, the designers create storyboards and
graphics. If e-learning is involved, programmers develop or integrate technologies. Testers debug
materials and procedures. The project is reviewed and revised according to feedback.
Implementation phase
The implementation phase develops procedures for training facilitators and learners. Training
facilitators cover the course curriculum, learning outcomes, method of delivery, and testing
procedures. Preparation for learners includes training them on new tools (software or hardware)
and student registration. Implementation includes evaluation of the design.
This is also the phase where the project manager ensures that books, hands-on equipment, tools,
CD-ROMs, and software are in place, and that the learning application or website functions.
Evaluation phase
The evaluation phase consists of two parts: formative and summative. Formative evaluation is
present in each stage of the ADDIE process.
Formative assessment or diagnostic testing is a range of formal and informal assessment
procedures employed by teachers during the learning process in order to modify teaching and
learning activities to improve student attainment.[1] It typically involves qualitative feedback
(rather than scores) for both student and teacher that focuses on the details of content and
performance.[2] It is commonly contrasted with summative assessment, which seeks to monitor
educational outcomes, often for purposes of external accountability.[
Images of ADDIE Models are shown at:
https://www.google.com/search?q=ADDIE+Model&client=firefoxa&hs=s7p&rls=org.mozilla:enUS:official&channel=sb&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=RAiVJiQNYHLggSP0IGgAg&ved=0CCwQsAQ&biw=1365&bih=638.
You Tube Video of the ADDIE Model
Assessment/Analysis Phase:

Design Phase:

UC-JHOrcaH.
Development Phase:

Implementation Phases:

UC-JHOrcaH.
Evaluation Phase

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