+1(978)310-4246 credencewriters@gmail.com


the Porter 5 forces

framework to evaluate the

firm’ external environment.

For each of the five forces, the

student provides the rationale

as to why the threat should be

considered low, medium, or


The case study file is below.

For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Kelly Whitehead and Steven Campbell wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to
illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other
identifying information to protect confidentiality.
This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca; www.iveycases.com.
Copyright © 2018, Ivey Business School Foundation
Version: 2018-04-27
In November 2017, Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) was at a critical impasse. The company, although
beloved in the Canadian retail landscape for its rich Canadian heritage, faced significant pressure from
activist investor Land & Buildings Investment Management (LBIM) after recording a CA$201 million2 loss
in the second quarter (Q2) of 2017, amid failures to monetize its real estate assets.3 LBIM alleged that HBC
was withholding information about a potential offer from management to take the company private, while
suggesting that HBC was waiting for an industry turnaround that, in the current retail environment, was
unlikely to occur.4 HBC responded by focusing on cost-cutting measures, including the removal of 2,000
jobs in June 2017 and the renewal of its interest in its e-commerce portfolio.5 However, with the
announcement that chief executive officer (CEO) Gerald Storch would be stepping down at the beginning
of November 2017 after the high-profile battle with LBIM, it was clear that HBC’s efforts were doing little
to assuage the activist’s concerns.6 How should HBC proceed to regain profitability in a Canadian retail
environment that was increasingly pessimistic for brick-and-mortar department stores?
HBC was the oldest retailer on the Canadian market and had risen from humble beginnings as a fur trading
company in 1670, nearly two centuries prior to Canada’s Confederation. Although it initially targeted only
the trading posts around James Bay and Hudson’s Bay, by the late 18th century, the company had expanded
into the interior of Canada. The posts it developed along the river networks predated the major Canadian
cities soon to follow, such as Winnipeg, Calgary, and Edmonton. HBC began its transformation into a
department store retailer in the early 20th century, with a modernization program in 1912 resulting in what
was referred to as the original six HBC department stores: Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, Victoria,
Saskatoon, and Winnipeg.7 The company would later expand its department store presence, continuing its
path toward becoming an iconic Canadian retailer.
Although known as a Canadian brand, HBC was a British company until its Canadian incorporation in
1970, 300 years after its founding.8 The company then began an aggressive acquisition strategy in an effort
to dominate the Canadian retail environment, purchasing the Shop-Rite catalogue stores; Ottawa retailer A.
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.
For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Page 2
J. Freiman Ltd. in 1972;9 Zellers/Fields and Simpsons in 1978; and Robinson’s in 1979.10 As a result of the
economic downturn of the 1980s, however, the company needed to rethink its acquisition strategy, and it
chose instead to sell off non-essential assets, such as the fur trade, wholesale, and Northern Stores
departments in 1987.11 This early turnaround strategy was successful, resulting in HBC’s continued
dominance of the retail environment into the 1990s.
The 1990s saw HBC returning to its acquisition strategy with the purchase of the Woodward’s department
stores in Western Canada in 1993 and Kmart Canada in 1998. The company opened three Bed, Bath, and
More stores in the Greater Toronto Area in 1998 and renamed them Home Outfitters in 1999, a sign of
further diversification of HBC’s presence in the Canadian retail market.12
In 2000, HBC entered the e-commerce arena with the launch of HBC.com, followed by its entrance into
loyalty programs with HBC Rewards.13 In 2005, the company’s Canadian identity was further solidified after
it was selected as the official retailer of the Olympic and Paralympic Games,14 with the red “Canadian Olympic
Team” mittens later becoming an iconic product associated with HBC at an affordable price of $15 per pair.15
It was clear that the company’s long Canadian history and resilience in the face of economic downturn was a
significant strength in developing a sustained competitive advantage.
In 2015, HBC further diversified its retail operations, entering the European market with the acquisition of
Germany’s Galeria Kaufhof and its Belgian subsidiary, Inno, for $3.9 billion.16 Since the acquisition,
however, the sales at the German department store had consistently fallen, resulting in pressure from LBIM
to sell off the acquisition. Concurrent with the resignation of CEO Gerald Storch, HBC received what it
referred to as an “incomplete, non-binding, and unsolicited offer” of approximately $4.5 billion, from
Austrian firm Signa Holding, resulting in a 9 per cent jump in HBC’s share price. Although HBC had
indicated that it was uninterested in selling the Galeria Kaufhof acquisition in September 2017, the board
later announced that it was intending to review the offer.17
HBC was plagued by fiscal challenges in 2017 (see Exhibit 1). Its first quarter (Q1) net losses reached a
staggering $221 million, more than double the losses incurred during Q1 2016.18 Shortly thereafter, the company
announced that the chief financial officer, Paul Beesley, had submitted his resignation effective July 2017.19
Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC then downgraded the company’s credit rating to a B, which, although
negative, was consistent with a broad industry downgrade prompted by poor performance in the retail sector as
a whole.20
Q2 2017 was equally disappointing. Net losses for the period totalled $201 million and were accompanied
by a reduction in the dividend rate from $0.05 per share to $0.0125 per share. In light of these difficulties,
HBC announced the launch of its “Transformation Plan” (see Exhibit 2), which included a focus on its
digital operations and the reduction of approximately 2,000 positions across North America. This major
restructuring was presented with the expectation that it would bring $350 million in annual savings
following its completion in 201821 and included a plan to separate leadership teams for the iconic HBC
brand from that of its newer acquisition, Lord & Taylor.22 Richard Baker, governor and executive chairman
of HBC, commented on the release of the plan:
We are re-allocating resources to accelerate the opportunity we see online, as we run our brick and
mortar operations more efficiently. Our team is taking the right steps to optimize our North
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.
For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Page 3
American business and create efficiencies by leveraging the scale of our company. At this critical
moment of change in the retail industry, I believe in the future of our all-channel model and we are
adapting to meet the evolving needs of our customers.23
However, the company’s turnaround plan was unable to alleviate concerns from industry analysts, as
Moody’s Corporation mirrored the earlier decision by Standard & Poor’s and downgraded its credit ratings
for HBC from B1 to B2. Turnover in top management continued, as Don Watros, the president of HBC
International, chose to vacate his position effective September 2017.24
HBC’s misfortunes reached a nadir in October 2017 when Gerald Storch, CEO of HBC, joined the exodus of
top executives from the company.25 His exit was not entirely unexpected, given rumours of continual
disagreement between company leaders regarding the future direction of the firm.26 However, his sudden
departure after less than three years at the helm and the concomitant optics of such rapid leadership turnover
did little to alleviate investors’ fears. In response to this development, Richard Baker was chosen to serve as
the interim CEO while an executive search firm looked for a permanent replacement.27
Exacerbating these financial concerns was the escalating tension between HBC’s top management and its
activist investor, LBIM. LBIM wrote its first public letter to HBC shortly after the company’s annual
shareholder meeting in 2017, urging HBC to redevelop its Saks Fifth Avenue flagship store and tap into the
value of its real estate holdings.28 Specifically, LBIM was concerned that the value of the company’s real
estate holdings was estimated to be $6.4 billion, translating to $35 per share, a far cry from the sub $11
trading price.29 While Baker had been successful in monetizing real estate deals in the past, he had yet to
spin off a significant proportion of HBC’s real estate assets.30 As it had a nearly 5 per cent ownership stake
in HBC, LBIM stated that if it did not see “substantive progress on a plan to close the gap to underlying
asset value,” it would have to call for a special shareholder meeting.31
A second instance of public disagreement surrounded the sale of Galeria Kaufhof. After the offer from
Signa Holding, LBIM penned a letter to shareholders stating that the company should “seriously consider”
the offer, as the bid was higher than the $3.9 billion purchase price paid by HBC in 2015.32 Furthermore,
LBIM criticized HBC about its lack of transparency surrounding possible offers by management to take the
company private.33 Although lenders had become cautious about financing leveraged buyouts in the retail
sector, due to the rapid disruptions occurring in the industry, LBIM believed that HBC would be an
exception, given the potential for monetizing its disproportionately large real estate holdings.34
These difficulties were compounded by the Competition Bureau’s concurrent investigation into the
company’s allegedly deceptive pricing practices in relation to sales of its mattress sets. Early inquiries into
HBC’s pricing for its sleep sets claimed that it “grossly inflated regular prices” and advertised enormous
discounts to encourage consumers to buy the products based on the mistaken belief that they had found a
deal. The Canadian Competition Act prevented retailers from misleading the public about ordinary selling
prices, providing a strict criteria that was based on the volume of sales for determining the selling price
from which sales discounts could be calculated.35
HBC was under fire for having failed to adhere to this policy, and the Competition Bureau alleged that several
of HBC’s advertisements fell into the category of deceptive marketing practices. For example, a 2013 flyer
advertised a Beautyrest TruEnergy Brooklyn queen-sized mattress at a $1,800 discount from its regular $3,098
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.
For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Page 4
price. Given that HBC had sold only a single set at the full price in the months prior to the 2013 sale, it did
not meet the volume requirements set by the Competition Bureau to determine a regular sale price. In addition,
the mattress set had not been sold for long enough to satisfy the “good faith” aspect of the Bureau’s other
standard for establishing a regular sale price, otherwise referred to as the “time test.” As a result, the Bureau
was seeking payment from HBC of a significant monetary penalty; if successful, this application would further
impact the company’s negative financial performance.36
Although the Canadian retail industry was projected to increase in value by 17.7 per cent by 2020,38 the
breakdown of industry growth represented a threat to HBC’s long-term success. While this growth rate was
strong, it was primarily driven by the e-commerce segment, which held a 15 per cent projected growth rate in
comparison to the mere 3 per cent forecasted for brick-and-mortar retailers.39 In addition, Canadian consumers
continually held higher expectations for shipping and service standards for online sales, which HBC was only
just beginning to address with the changes to its digital operations in the “Transformation Plan.”40
Trends toward digitizing the store experience and continued threats from big-box online retailers such as
Amazon placed pressure on HBC in its restructuring process.41 HBC’s main competitors in the industry
included Sears Canada Inc. (Sears), and Nordstrom Canada, both of which directly competed in the
department store environment.
Sears Canada
Sears began serving the Canadian market in 1952 under the banner of Simpsons-Sears Ltd., quickly
attaining a strong foothold in the Canadian retail industry42 through its mail-order services. After HBC
acquired the Simpsons company in 1978, the Simpsons-Sears partnership was dissolved, and the company
formally changed its name to Sears Canada Inc. as of 1984. Sears’s performance peaked in the late 1990s
with the acquisition of the T. Eaton Company Ltd., providing the department store with coveted real estate
locations, such as the high-traffic tourist stop of the Toronto Eaton Centre.43 At that time, many expected
Sears to take over Eaton’s market share in the Canadian retail sphere.44
Sears began struggling in 2009, initially laying off 300 workers, which, at the time, represented less than 1
per cent of its workforce.45 The company’s struggles were well-illustrated through the considerable turnover
in its top management team, with former CEO Calvin McDonald (2011–2013) abruptly stepping down from
the position in the middle of a three-year turnover strategy, and former CEOs Douglas C. Campbell (2013–
2014) and Ronald Boire (2014–2015) each spending only a year in the position.46 Although Sears made
considerable efforts to stay solvent, including the sale of three leases to Cadillac Fairview Corporation Ltd.
in 201247 and a rebranding in 2016,48 the company continued to face financial difficulties in the years
preceding 2017.
Then came 2017, which represented the culmination of years of financial struggles for the company. Sales
had declined from $6.7 billion in 2001 to $2.6 billion in 2016, primarily due to the company’s failure to
adapt to the changing retail landscape, specifically in the e-commerce arena.49 Sears began the 2017 fiscal
year by recording a loss of $144 million, with top management voicing strong concerns for the liquidity of
the company in the Q1 report.50 Financial struggles worsened with the June 2017 announcement of the
closure of 59 stores and the layoffs of 2,900 employees without severance in a court-supervised
restructuring.51 Liquidation sales at these locations began in mid-July, and as of October 2017, the company
requested court approval to liquidate its remaining locations, leaving 12,000 employees without jobs.52 It
was clear that Sears had been unable to adapt its role as a mail-order retailer to the e-commerce arena.
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.
For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Page 5
Nordstrom Canada
While other companies struggled, Nordstrom emerged as a leader in the Canadian retail space.53 Unlike
Sears and HBC, the company’s third-quarter (Q3) 2017 earnings were positive, with net sales increasing
2 per cent over the same period in the previous year.54 Nordstrom entered the Canadian market in the
immediate wake of Target’s failure in 2014, allowing the U.S. retailer to learn from Target’s mistakes.55
Target introduced 124 locations in mid-2013, prompting complaints of empty shelves and high prices,
resulting in its swift exit from the Canadian market within two years of its entrance.56 Nordstrom, in
contrast, chose a slow-and-steady approach, choosing to introduce its first six stores over two-and-a-half
years in an attempt to ensure that the company fully understood the Canadian retail environment.57
Known for its exceptional customer service,58 Nordstrom further experimented in the retail sphere to stay at
the forefront of the industry, introducing variations on its traditional department store offerings such as
Nordstrom Rack, which offered discounted luxury goods,59 and Nordstrom Local, which were stores without
inventory, where personal stylists were employed to curate and acquire outfits for shoppers.60 The company
also allowed customers to buy products online and pick up the orders in-store, providing a further diversified
experience for their consumer base.61 As a result of these initiatives, Nordstrom had shown a unique ability to
stay abreast of industry developments and successfully adjust to the demands of a dynamic retail environment.
Although HBC had launched its e-commerce site in 2000, predating many other competitors, its online
performance still lagged behind other e-commerce giants.62 Sales rose by 11 per cent in Q3 2017, showing
relatively strong performance in the e-commerce sector, with online sales worth $2.5 billion across the HBC
chains and subsidiaries. However, a basic comparison between Amazon, as an online retail giant, and HBC, as
an early mover in the online retail space, showed significant disadvantages for HBC. A 2017 article in the Globe
and Mail quoted Baker’s assertion that he had heard plenty of complaints regarding HBC’s online presence:
This Hudson’s Bay Co. can’t get it right—why does Amazon’s order come in one day and I have
to wait three days [for HBC], and I’m on the call centre for eight minutes instead of two minutes at
Amazon? Because the amount of money we’re able to spend solving these problems is less, because
our shareholders—rightfully—want a return on their investment.63
Although Baker noted that Amazon shareholders were happy to not receive a return on their investment, he did
not address the declining dividend at HBC amid the financial troubles in 2017.64 However, HBC’s
“Transformation Plan” was intended to streamline the digital operations, with a notable change including the
integration of HBC’s digital group into the firm’s logistics and supply chain operations, aiming to improve the
fulfillment process for products ordered online.65 Although HBC lagged behind major competitors in the online
sphere, the company was clearly making strategic moves to improve its positioning.
HBC’s continued struggle in the Canadian retail environment proved to be challenging, and the cost-cutting
measures of the Transformation Plan proved insufficient to manage the complexities of the industry
changes. On the one hand, its history, which predated Canada’s Confederation, showed HBC’s resilience
in the face of multiple economic downturns in the past and represented a significant strength for the
company. On the other hand, HBC appeared to be overextended, as it managed both a struggling
e-commerce portfolio and a European expansion through its ailing Kaufhaus branch. The company also
needed to consider how best to respond to the concerns from LBIM. How should HBC proceed?
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.
For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Page 6
Hudson’s Bay Company Overview
Trading Price (October 31, 2017)
Shares Outstanding (in millions)
Cash (in millions of CA$)
Short-Term Debt (in millions of CA$)
Historical Short-Term Interest Rates
Long-Term Debt (in millions of CA$)
Historical Long-Term Interest Rates
Total Tax Loss Carryforwards (2016) (in millions of CA$)
Note: The interest rate ranges are based on historical borrowings, including revolving credit facilities, term loans, and
Hudson’s Bay Company Financial Statements Summary (in millions of CA$)
2016 (26
2017 (26 Weeks)
Operating Expenses
Net Capital Expenditures
Changes in Net Working Capital
Note: The 2016 26-week data are included as a reference for the comparable 26-week period in 2017; EBITDA = earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization; EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes.
Source: Created by the authors using information from “Hudson’s Bay Company,” Google Finance, October 31, 2017,
accessed December 28, 2017, https://finance.google.ca/finance?q=TSE:HBC; Hudson’s Bay Company, 2017 Q2 Interim
Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements, Investor.hbc.com, September 5, 2017, accessed December 28, 2017,
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-1ETYKL/5769895658x0x955781/430FF6F6-B09F-4A04-A8A3F91101E7900E/HBC_Financial_Statements_Q2_2017_FINAL.pdf; Hudson’s Bay Company, Annual Information Form for the
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.
For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Page 7
The Hudson’s Bay Company Transformation Plan was designed to increase operational synergies, sharpen
capabilities, and reduce expenses. It also included the following changes:
Leadership teams: Create two distinct leadership teams to drive market-specific strategies, one focused on
Hudson’s Bay Company and one dedicated to Lord & Taylor. The Hudson’s Bay Company leadership team
would focus on accelerating plans to build on its successful transformation in Canada, while the Lord &
Taylor leadership team would focus on increasing the pace of change at that U.S. banner, with an emphasis
on driving digital opportunities while operating its stores more efficiently.
Digital Portfolio: Integrate digital functions throughout the organization to develop and maximize the impact
of all-channel solutions for marketing, operations, and technology in an effort to deliver the most seamless
in-store and online experience for Hudson Bay Company’s customers.
Alignment of Resources: Realign company resources, including Information Technology (IT) and Digital;
Store Operations & Visual Merchandising; Buying & Planning; and Marketing to increase efficiencies and
leverage scale, with world-class centres of excellence that support banners while preserving differentiation
among the businesses.
In-Store Service: Optimize in-store service and enhance sales training for store associates to better serve
Hudson Bay Company’s customers.
Job Cuts: Reduce the employee base by approximately 2,000 positions, including those previously
announced in February, which would both streamline the decision-making process and flatten the
organization by removing layers to make Hudson’s Bay Company more nimble.
Procurement Savings: Fully leverage the size and scale of the company to optimize procurement and
generate additional savings.
Source: Created by the authors using “HBC Announces Transformation Plan for North American Operations to Deliver BestIn-Class All-Channel Customer Experience,” news release, Business Wire, June 8, 2017, accessed December 28, 2017,
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.
For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Page 8
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in this case are not necessarily those of Hudson’s Bay Company or any of its employees.
All currency amounts are in Canadian dollars.
Francine Kopun, “Hudson’s Bay under Fire from Investment Firm after $201M Loss in ‘Very Disappointing’ Quarter,” Toronto
Star, September 6, 2017, accessed December 19, 2017, https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/09/06/hudsons-bay-loses201m-in-very-disappointing-quarter.html.
Linda Nguyen and David Hodges, “Hudson’s Bay to Cut 2,000 Jobs as Part of Corporate Restructuring,” City News, June 8, 2017,
accessed December 19, 2017, http://toronto.citynews.ca/2017/06/08/hudsons-bay-cut-2000-jobs-part-corporate-restructuring/.
Alexandra Posadzki, “HBC CEO Gerald Storch Stepping Down,” Globe and Mail, October 20, 2017, accessed December 19, 2017,
HBC, “A Brief History of HBC,” HBCHeritage.ca., accessed December 19, 2017, www.hbcheritage.ca/history/companystories/a-brief-history-of-hbc.
Marketline, “Hudson’s Bay Company – Strategy, SWOT and Corporate Finance Report,” Marketline Advantage, February
10, 2017, accessed December 31, 2017, https://store.marketline.com/report/4a73db43-d70d-40d7-802d-824d6fc898f5-hudsons-bay-company-strategy-swot-and-corporate-finance-report/.
HBC, op. cit.
Marketline, “Hudson’s Bay Company,” op. cit.
HBC, op. cit.
Marilisa Racco, “HBC Unveils Team Canada Collection and Canadians Are Pretty Excited,” Global News, October 3, 2017,
accessed December 31, 2017, https://globalnews.ca/news/3782547/hbc-unveils-team-canada-collection-and-canadians-arepretty-excited/.
Marina Strauss, “Baker’s Battle,” Globe and Mail, November 30, 2017, accessed December 31, 2017,
“Austrian Firm Makes Bid for HBC’s Galeria Kaufhof of Germany,” CBC News, November 1, 2017, accessed December 31,
2017, www.cbc.ca/news/business/hbc-Galeria-kaufhof-1.4382036.
Hudson’s Bay Company, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the
Hudson’s Bay Company, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the
Thirteen and Twenty-six Weeks Ended July 29, 2017, September 5, 2017, accessed December 28, 2017,
Daphne Howland, “Hudson’s Bay to Cut 2k Jobs amid ‘Transformation Plan,” Retail Dive, June 9, 2017, accessed December
28, 2017, https://www.retaildive.com/news/hudsons-bay-to-cut-2k-jobs-amid-transformation-plan/444633/.
Hudson’s Bay Company, “HBC Announces Transformation Plan for North American Operations to Deliver Best-In-Class AllChannel Customer Experience,” press release, Business Wire, June 8, 2017, accessed December 28, 2017,
Hudson’s Bay Company, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the
Thirteen and Twenty-six Weeks Ended July 29, 2017, op. cit.
Posadzki, op. cit.
Walter Loeb, “CEO Jerry Storch Exiting in Shakeup at Hudson’s Bay Company,” Forbes, October 21, 2017, accessed December
28, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterloeb/2017/10/21/shakeup-at-hbc-jerry-storch-leaves-company/#51554fc43245.
Posadzki, op. cit.
Rachelle Younglai, “U.S. Fund Threatens Board Fight in Push to Restructure HBC,” Globe and Mail, July 31, 2017, accessed January
2, 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/activist-pushes-for-hbc-to-sell-saks-go-private/article35841521/.
Strauss, op. cit.
Kopun, op. cit.
“HBC Investor Turns Up Heat on Retailer to Tap into Value of Its Real Estate,” CBC News, July 31, 2017, accessed January
2, 2018, www.cbc.ca/news/business/hbc-investor-lands-buildings-1.4229128.
“Austrian Firm Makes Bid for HBC’s Galeria Kaufhof of Germany,” CBC News, November 1, 2017, accessed January 2,
2018, www.cbc.ca/news/business/hbc-Galeria-kaufhof-1.4382036.
Kopun, op. cit.
Hollie Shaw, “In Sears’ Shadow: Hudson’s Bay CEO Exit Has Investors Nervous about Department Stores’ Future,”
Financial Post, October 23, 2017, accessed January 2, 2018, http://business.financialpost.com/news/retail-marketing/insears-shadow-hudsons-bay-ceos-exit-leaves-investors-nervous-about-future-of-department-stores.
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.
For the exclusive use of D. McDaniel III, 2020.
Page 9
Solomon Israel, “Hudson’s Bay Co. Misled Consumers on Mattress Prices Says Competition Bureau,” CBC News, February 22,
2017, accessed January 2, 2018, www.cbc.ca/news/business/competition-bureau-hudsons-bay-mattress-1.3994068.
Linda Nguyen, “Canadian Retailers Must Disrupt—Or Be Disrupted,” Toronto Star, December 14, 2016, accessed January
2, 2018, https://www.thestar.com/business/2016/12/14/canadian-retailers-must-disrupt-or-be-disrupted.html.
“Canada—Apparel Retail,” Marketline Advantage, September 13, 2016, accessed January 2, 2018.
Nguyen, op. cit.
Hudson’s Bay Company, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the
Thirteen and Twenty-six Weeks ended July 29, 2017, op. cit.
Nguyen, op. cit.
Katie Dangerfield, “Sears Canada: The rise and fall of the department store empire,” Global News, October 13, 2017,
accessed April 19, 2018, https://globalnews.ca/news/3796409/sears-canada-history/.
The Canadian Press, “Timeline: Sears Canada through the Decades,” BNN, October 11, 2017, accessed January 2, 2018,
Hollie Shaw, “‘Following the Eaton’s Death Spiral’ Sears to End 65 Years of Retail History,” Financial Post, October 10, 2017,
accessed January 2, 2018, http://business.financialpost.com/news/retail-marketing/brief-sears-canada-to-seek-courtapproval-for-liquidation.
The Canadian Press, op. cit.
Aleksandra Sagan and Linda Nguyen, “Timeline: The Rise and Decline of Sears Canada,” CTV News, June 13, 2017,
accessed January 2, 2018, https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/timeline-the-rise-and-decline-of-sears-canada-1.3457205.
“Sears Canada’s Most Valuable Real Estate [Analysis],” Retail Insider, July 25, 2017, accessed January 2, 2018,
Sagan and Nguyen, op. cit.
Shaw, “‘Following the Eaton’s Death Spiral’ Sears to End 65 Years of Retail History,” op. cit.
Sears Canada Inc., “Sears Canada Announces First Quarter 2017 Results,” press release, Newswire, June 13, 2017, accessed
January 2, 2018, https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/sears-canada-announces-first-quarter-2017-results-628147053.html.
Murad Hemmadi, “Sears Canada: The Timeline of Its Slow-Motion Collapse,” Maclean’s, August 22, 2017, accessed
January 2, 2018, www.macleans.ca/economy/business/sears-canada-the-timeline-of-its-slow-motion-collapse/.
Sagan and Nguyen, op. cit.
Lauren Thomas, “Nordstrom to Roll Out Smaller Stores with No Merchandise, More Experiences,” CNBC, September 11,
2017, accessed January 2, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/11/nordstrom-to-roll-out-small-nordstrom-local-shops-withno-inventory.html.
Nordstrom, “Nordstrom Reports Third Quarter 2017 Earnings,” news release, Nordstrom.com, November 9, 2017, accessed
January 2, 2018, http://investor.nordstrom.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=93295&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2316007.
Marina Strauss, “Nordstrom Bets on a Slow, Cautious Entry into Canada,” Globe and Mail, August 18, 2014, accessed January 2,
2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/nordstrom-bets-on-a-slow-entry-into-canada/article20100322/.
Hayley Peterson, “5 Reasons Target Failed in Canada,” Business Insider, January 15, 2015, accessed January 2, 2018,
Strauss, “Nordstrom Bets on a Slow, Cautious Entry into Canada,” op. cit.
The Associated Press, “Nordstrom Temporarily Halts Its Search for Buyer,” Toronto Star, October 16, 2017, accessed January 2,
2018, https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/10/16/nordstrom-temporarily-halts-its-search-for-buyer.html.
Thomas, op. cit.
Marketline, “Hudson’s Bay Company,” op. cit.
Strauss, “Baker’s Battle”, op. cit.
Hudson’s Bay Company, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the
Thirteen and Twenty-six Weeks Ended July 29, 2017, op. cit.
This document is authorized for use only by David McDaniel III in MBA 682 Fall 2020 taught by MARIE-MICHELE BEAUCHESNE, Barry University from Aug 2020 to Dec 2020.

Purchase answer to see full

error: Content is protected !!