I’m working on a writing question and need an explanation and answer to help me learn.
Charles Joseph Kastigar and Michael Gorean Stewart, Petitioners, were both subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury to answer its questions under a grant of immunity. The petitioners refused to answer questions, asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, despite a grant of immunity proffered by the respondent United States. The district court held that the petitioners could be compelled to testify. The decision was affirmed on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The explicit prescription in
18 U.S.C.S. Â§ 6002
of the use in any criminal case of testimony or other information compelled under an order to make testimony (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or additional information) is consonant with
standards. Such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.
If I was on the case I woukd rule that yes the court can compel someone to testify if they have immunity. In my decision however the main reason or key word would be immunity.Immunity is an exemption from a legal requirement, prosecution, or penalty granted by government authorities or statute. The main types of immunity are witness immunity, public officials immunity from liability, sovereign immunity, and diplomatic immunity. Legal immunity, or immunity from prosecution, is a legal status wherein an individual or entity cannot be held liable for a violation of the law, in order to facilitate societal aims that outweigh the value of imposing liability in such cases. If immunity was not a part of the question my answer would be no.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the respondent could compel testimony by the petitioners despite the fact that they had invoked their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring on them immunity from use of compelled testimony. Immunity from use and derivative use was coextensive with the scope of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore, despite the lack of a grant of transactional immunity, was sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. Transactional immunity would have afforded broader protection than the
privilege, and was not constitutionally required. The immunity provided by the respondent left the petitioners and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if they had claimed the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.