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Pick any ONE of these questions to answer:


What role did World War II play in the development of human rights? (Include any significant documents, atrocities, and how those atrocities were addressed).

What do the struggles of African Americans in the U.S. in the 1940s reveal about the U.S.’ commitment to human rights?

What is the debate between universalism and relativism in human rights? How do universalism and relativism play out in the context of debate around the French burkini ban?

What does it mean to say that human rights are socially constructed? Why do they need to be socially constructed, and how? Use at least two illustrative examples from the lecture and reading.

In what ways can transnational support for human rights claims help a local cause, and in what ways can it harm a local cause? Discuss at least one example of each possibility (minimum two examples overall).

What is Vernacularization and why do human rights intermediaries engage in it? Discuss at least two examples from the lecture and reading. What are some of the challenges of vernacularization in promoting human rights?

Global Human Rights (IS 16/ Pol Sci 45A/ Soc Sci 16).
Winter 2021
Mid-Term Essay
(covering Weeks 1-4)
These essay questions have been posted on Canvas under the Syllabus module
as well as under Assignments: Midterm Essay.
You will be writing ONE essay. Choose any ONE question to answer among
the options provided.
YOU NEED TO PICK. Do not answer all the questions and then have us pick the
ones you scored best on.
For essay-writing tips, please see the link posted on the course syllabus as well
as under Modules: Syllabus.
ï‚– 1-2 single-spaced pages.
Sources you are expected to use
ï‚– Lecture material (ppts, videos, links included on lecture ppts).
ï‚– Main assigned course reading for the topic/s related to the question.
ï‚– OPTIONAL: Any news stories/ other real-world examples that support your
essay. Please use these sources only in addition to, not instead of, the course
References and Citation
ï‚– Please make sure to name all authors and videos you reference in your essay,
with dates of publication.
o You will lose points for not doing so.
ï‚– Please also include a Works Cited/Bibliography section at the end of your essay.
o You will lose points for not doing so.
ï‚– On Canvas under Modules: Syllabus, there is a ppt on how to do APA citations.
o Please take a look at it if you do not know how to do in-text citations and
Works Cited/ Bibliography.
Submission Deadline
• Due on Canvas by Tues of Week 5, February 2, 11:59 p.m.
• Grace Period: You may submit up to Wed, February 3, 9 a.m. with no penalty.
Policy on Submission Deadline
ï‚– No late papers, please. We need time to grade and return the papers within a
reasonable time frame.
ï‚– If you do not turn your essay in by the grace period, the late submission policy
will start to apply, with the exception of truly extenuating circumstances cleared
beforehand. 2 points will be taken off per day your paper is late.
Global Human Rights (IS 16/ Pol Sci 45A/ Soc Sci 16).
Winter 2021
Submission Instructions
ï‚– The assignment has been set up on Canvas as Midterm Essay.
o Please upload your essays under this assignment category.
ï‚– Formats for uploads: doc, docx, or pdf.
ï‚– If you encounter any technical difficulties with your submission:
o Please let us know by or before the deadline.
o If you are unable to submit via Canvas, please make sure to email your
essays (correctly labeled) to Prof. Ramachandran and both the TAs, Shannon
and Jessica. If you do so by or before the submission deadline, you won’t
lose any points.
Grading Information
Your essay is worth 10 points and constitutes 15% of your grade in the class, as
indicated on the syllabus.
Grading CRITERIA: Each of these criteria is worth two points.
Answered the Question?
Quality of Analysis
Quality of Writing
Use of Course Material–Reading
Use of Course Material–Lecture
For details: Consult the grading criteria at the end of this document.
Any evidence of plagiarism places the entire essay into C or a lower grade,
depending on the extent of plagiarism exhibited. For details, please see the
statement on Academic Integrity on your course syllabus, and the Canvas
document on grading criteria for midterm and final essays.
For clarifications on the essay instructions:
You can come to Professor Ramachandran’s drop-in office hours on Mon of Week 5
from 2-3 p.m. Zoom link: https://uci.zoom.us/j/6073498021
Is it possible to get feedback on drafts of essays?
Please see the Announcement made by our TA, Shannon, during Week 3.
Pick any ONE of these questions to answer:
1. What role did World War II play in the development of human rights? (Include
any significant documents, atrocities, and how those atrocities were addressed).
Global Human Rights (IS 16/ Pol Sci 45A/ Soc Sci 16).
Winter 2021
2. What do the struggles of African Americans in the U.S. in the 1940s reveal about
the U.S.’ commitment to human rights?
3. What is the debate between universalism and relativism in human rights? How
do universalism and relativism play out in the context of debate around the
French burkini ban?
4. What does it mean to say that human rights are socially constructed? Why do
they need to be socially constructed, and how? Use at least two illustrative
examples from the lecture and reading.
5. In what ways can transnational support for human rights claims help a local
cause, and in what ways can it harm a local cause? Discuss at least one
example of each possibility (minimum two examples overall).
6. What is Vernacularization and why do human rights intermediaries engage in it?
Discuss at least two examples from the lecture and reading. What are some of
the challenges of vernacularization in promoting human rights?
Grading Rubric
This rubric is merely a guide. All possible scenarios that come up during grading cannot
be covered or anticipated, some essays may be strong in some areas and weak in
others, and grading is always in comparison to the rest of the class.

Each essay will be worth 10 points.
Each criteria in the rubric is worth two points.
Any evidence of plagiarism places the entire essay into C or a lower grade,
depending on the extent of plagiarism exhibited.
98 –100 B+
92 – 97 B
A90 – 91 B-
88 – 89
82 – 87
80 – 81
78 – 79
72 – 77
70 – 71
Converted to points out of 10:
A+ 9.8-10
A 9.2-9.7
A- 9.0-9.1
B+ 8.8-8.9
B 8.2-8.7
B- 8.0-8.1
C+ 7.8-7.9
C 7.2-7.7
C- 7.0-7.1
D+ 6.8-6.9
D 6.2-6.7
D- 6.0-6.1
68 – 69
62 – 67
60 – 61
0 – 59
Global Human Rights (IS 16/ Pol Sci 45A/ Soc Sci 16).
Winter 2021
Converted to points out of 2
A+ 1.96-2
A 1.84-1.94
A- 1.8-1.82
B+ 1.76-1.78
B 1.64-1.74
B- 1.6-1.62
C+ 1.56-1.58
C 1.44-1.54
C- 1.4-1.42
D+ 1.36-1.38
D 1.24-1.34
D- 1.2-1.22
F 0-1.18
Global Human RightsMeets
(IS 16/ Pol
Sci 45A/ Soc
Sci 16).
Meets all of
Overall a good
all of
these criteria
post, with some
Winter 2021
for an
“A” post
combination of
the following
Demonstrate a
greater extent
of the flaws
listed under Aposts and/ or
other flaws
under this
Demonstrate a
greater extent
of the flaws
listed under B+
posts and/or
other flaws
under this
Demonstrate a
greater extent
of the flaws
listed under B
posts and/or
other flaws
under this
Answered the
answered the
answered the
question, with
1-2 missing
errors, etc.
answered the
question, with
more than 2
errors, etc.
Missed out on
three important
components of
Missed out on
more than
three important
components of
Quality of
Analysis is
headed in the
right direction,
but is
and/or partially
Weak and/or
Analysis is
minimal at
Some lack of
clarity in
lack of clarity in
lack of clarity in
Complete lack
of clarity in
“all over the
Draws upon
the reading, but
could have
made better
use of it – lacks
or elaboration.
Uses the
minimally from
the reading.
Draws upon
parts of it that
are not relevant
to what was
covered in
lecture. Uses
the reading
It is evident
that the student
cites authors
only from the
lecture slides,
not from the
Student does
not refer to the
main author/s
for the
assigned topic
as indicated on
the syllabus.
Original – no
plagiarism, no
reliance upon
generic internet
Makes strong
and effective
contrasts and
Uses illustrative
Quality of
Clearly written
and explained.
Use of
Material Reading
that the student
actually did the
reading (at least
the main
author/s from the
assigned topic
as indicated on
the syllabus).
Clearly written
draws upon/
about the
rather than
merely the
during lecture.
Use of
quotes etc.
Global Human Rights (IS 16/ Pol Sci 45A/ Soc Sci 16).
Winter 2021
Use of
Material Lecture
that the student
has paid
attention during
from the
reading is
effective, and
with the
issues and
debates +
uses authors,
videos etc.
correctly as
explained in
Explains issues
and debates +
uses authors
and videos as
explained in
lecture, with
and/ or
Uses ideas and
concepts from
lecture but
uses them
incorrectly or to
make the
argument to
what was
explained in
Uses ideas and
concepts from
material, but
the entire
framework is
different from
explanations in
Essay indicates
that the student
has barely paid
attention during
lecture or failed
to review the
lecture slides.
“C+” category essays:
In addition to the flaws of the “B” category essays:
Did not address most of the required components of the essay.
General treatment of the topic without any connection to class.
Demonstrate substantially incorrect or flawed understanding of topic.
“C” category essays:
Demonstrate any combination of the flaws of “C+” essays, +
Demonstrate completely incorrect or flawed understanding of topic.
Addressed at the most 1 component of the essay, which is somewhat clearly written.
“C-“category essays:
In addition to the problems with “C” essays:
Poorly Written.
About 1/4th of the essay is copy-pasted from wikipedia or other forms of plagiarism.
“D” category essays:
Any combination of the following problems:
Made some sort of vague point about the topic but completely lacking in any
connection to the class.
Did not address any of the components of the assignment.
Half or more of the essay is copy-pasted from wikipedia or exhibits other forms of
Global Human Rights (IS 16/ Pol Sci 45A/ Soc Sci 16).
Winter 2021
“F” category essays:
No submission.
Only copy/pasted or only used wikipedia or exhibits other forms of plagiarism.
Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade | Human Rights Watch
April ,
Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani
community in Belgrade
Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic
Mr Rasim Ljajić, Minister of Labour and Social Policy
Mr Svetozar iplić, Minister for Human and Minority Rights
Mr Dragan Đilas, Mayor of Belgrade
Re: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade
Honourable Sirs:
The European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) are writing to express
concern about failure of Serbian authorities to respect the rights of 47 Romani families forcibly evicted
from their informal homes in Novi Beograd on 3 April 2009, and to urge you to ensure that in the future
similar actions are undertaken in a manner which protects the rights of occupants laid out in
international law.
to media reports and ERRC documentation, on the day in question, police forcibly
Email address
Me In 128
Romani individuals, including women and children, living in Novi Beograd’s Block 67 and destroyed much
Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade | Human Rights Watch
of their personal property. Some are displaced persons from Kosovo. The day before the eviction was
conducted, residents were officially notified that in 15 days they would be removed from the property;
less than 24 hours after the notification was delivered, police arrived with bulldozers to carry out the
eviction and destroy their makeshift homes.
Although the evicted persons were told that alternative accommodation in containers was available in the
Boljevci settlement in the Municipality of Sur in, residents in Boljevci forcibly prevented the evicted
individuals from accessing it. As a result, the evicted Roma, including children, were forced to sleep
outside without any shelter on the night of the eviction. Some are now staying with neighbours but at
least 12 families remain on the streets. We understand that the Mayor of Belgrade has indicated that the
Roma who are not registered residents of Belgrade may not seek assistance from the Centre for Social
Assistance and the majority of the affected individuals are therefore not able to access alternative
The failure of the authorities to ensure adequate protections to the forcibly evicted community is all the
more worrying in light of the fact that several other sizable Romani communities face similar actions in
the near future.
As the current President of the Decade for Roma Inclusion, the Serbian government committed to
addressing housing as a priority area of action. Your government publicly declared commitments to the
“legalization and improvement of Roma settlements, relocation, [provision of] low cost housing and
[action] combating discrimination.” In addition, only one week prior to the forced eviction of the
concerned Roma, your government enacted a comprehensive new anti-discrimination law, banning
discrimination in the area of housing.
Absent provision of adequate alternative housing for all affected individuals, including some form of
security of tenure and social assistance for the affected families, the eviction constitutes a gross violation
of Serbia’s obligations under international human rights law.
As a State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Serbia is legally obligated to respect,
protect and fulfil the right to adequate housing, including the prohibition on forced evictions. The UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has defined, in paragraphs 15 and 16 of its General
Comment 7, appropriate protections from forced evictions as including the following:
(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected;
(b) adequate
date ofMe
address and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the scheduledCount
Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade | Human Rights Watch
(c) information on the proposed evictions, and, where applicable, on the alternative purpose for
which the land or housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those
(d) especially where groups of people are involved, government officials or their representatives to
be present during an eviction;
(e) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified;
(f) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected persons
consent otherwise;
(g) provision of legal remedies; and
(h) provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the
In addition, the Serbian government has a positive obligation to ensure that individuals are not rendered
homeless as a result of eviction and, where those affected are unable to provide for themselves, to “take
all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available resources, to ensure that adequate alternative
housing, resettlement or access to productive land, as the case may be, is available.”
Since some of the former residents of the Block 67 community are internally displaced persons, they
enjoy additional protections enumerated in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. According
to these guidelines, which restate and compile human rights and humanitarian law relevant to internally
displaced persons, the state has a positive obligation to ensure access to basic shelter and housing
(Principle 18, 2b) and no individual covered by the guidelines shall be deprived of property and
possessions (Principle 21).
The eviction conducted on 3 April clearly violates Serbian government’s obligations under international
human rights law. On the occasion of International Roma Day, the ERRC and HRW call on your
respective offices, in close consultation with Romani organisations, to take immediate and decisive action
to ensure an adequate and sustained alternative accommodation to all Roma forcibly evicted by
authorities in Novi Beograd on 3 April. In addition, the individuals concerned should be given
compensation for lost property and other damage associated with the forced eviction and destruction of
property. We also call on you to ensure that other Roma families are protected from forced eviction and
that any future actions in relation to evictions are carried out in accordance with Serbia’s international
Email address
Count Me In
Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade | Human Rights Watch
We respectfully request you to inform us of the measures undertaken in the matter as a matter of
Robert Kushen
ERRC Managing
Benjamin Ward
Associate Director
Europe and Central Asia division
Human Rights Watch
Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic
Mr Rasim Ljajić, Minister of Labour and Social Policy
Mr Svetozar iplić, Minister for Human and Minority Rights
Mr Dragan Đilas, Mayor of Belgrade
Mr Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner
Ms Raquel Rolnik, UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing
Ms Polonca Koncar, President of the European Committee of Social Rights
Ambassador Hans Ola Urstad, Head of OSCE Mission to Serbia
Mr Lenart Kotsalainen, Chief of the UNHCR mission to Serbia
Email address
Ms Judita Reichenberg, Representative, UNICEF Belgrade
Count Me In
Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade | Human Rights Watch
The ERRC is an international public interest law organisation engaging in a range of activities aimed at
combating anti-Romani racism and human rights abuse of Roma. The approach of the ERRC involves, in
particular, strategic litigation, international advocacy, research and policy development, and training of
Romani activists.
Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015″ Serbian Presidency July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009
Article 17(1)(2) of the ICCPR and Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, supported by General Comments 4 (right
to adequate housing) and 7 (protection against forced evictions) of the Committee on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights.
Your tax deductible gi can help stop human rights violations and save
lives around the world.
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Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade | Human Rights Watch
Region / Country Europe/Central Asia, Serbia/Kosovo
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Uganda: No Justice for
Kasese Massacre by Security Forces
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Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade | Human Rights Watch
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Journalist Murdered in Bulgaria – Daily Brief
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Tokyo: New Law Bars LGBT Discrimination
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“We Live in Constant Fear”
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Harsh Punishment
The Human Toll of Georgia’s Abusive Drug Policies
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Serbia: Forced Evictions of Romani community in Belgrade | Human Rights Watch
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Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism:
Mapping the Middle
ABSTRACT How do transnational ideas such as human rights approaches to violence against women become meaningful in local social
settings? How do they move across the gap between a cosmopolitan awareness of human rights and local sociocultural understandings
of gender and family? Intermediaries such as community leaders, nongovernmental organization participants, and social movement
activists play a critical role in translating ideas from the global arena down and from local arenas up. These are people who understand
both the worlds of transnational human rights and local cultural practices and who can look both ways. They are powerful in that they
serve as knowledge brokers between culturally distinct social worlds, but they are also vulnerable to manipulation and subversion by
states and communities. In this article, I theorize the process of translation and argue that anthropological analysis of translators helps
to explain how human rights ideas and interventions circulate around the world and transform social life. [Keywords: human rights,
translation, globalization, legal anthropology, transnationalism]
OW ARE TRANSNATIONAL IDEAS such as human rights approaches to violence against women
adopted in local social settings? How do they move across
the gap between a cosmopolitan awareness of human rights
and local sociocultural understandings of gender, family, and justice? Ethnographic research shows that human
rights ideas and practices developed in one locality are
being adopted or imposed transnationally in a variety of
ways. Legal documents and policy statements produced in
transnational sites such as UN conferences circulate globally through the work of movement activists and states.
Although the historical foundations of human rights and
much of their content are Western, they are currently important for social justice movements in many parts of the
world. Groups such as indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, and women (e.g., Cowan et al. 2001), as well as military
officials and government employees in Columbia and the
United States (Tate 2004), use human rights language and
techniques. Mark Goodale (2002) describes a local activist
in rural Bolivia who delivers a long lecture on women’s human rights to each couple he marries. Celestine NyamuMusembi (2002) shows how women’s human rights claims
to land ownership affect local administrative forums in
Kenya. Hussaina J. Abdullah (2002:152–153) describes the
growth of human rights and civil liberties activism in Nigeria while noting that the religious revivalism and authoritarian state feminism emerging at the same time have re-
inforced patriarchal structures, undermining the challenges
posed by the explosion in human rights activism.
There is also active resistance to these human rights
claims by elites who fear loss of power, states unwilling
to have their activities exposed, and men who want to retain their authority over women. Some local justice officials find that human rights ideas undermine their capacity to deliver justice in ways that they find reasonable. For
example, Shannon Speed and Jane Collier (2000) describe
the conflicts between understandings of justice shared by
judges in an indigenous community in Mexico and those
of human rights advocates who criticize local justice. Marilyn Strathern (2004:201–206) discusses a similar conflict
in Papua New Guinea: A woman acquiesced to being given
in marriage to another tribal group in compensation for a
death, but human rights activists objected that this was a violation of fundamental human rights and persuaded a judge
to overturn the settlement. The judge sought to promote a
vision of modernity based on choice. Women’s groups in
northern Nigeria that talk about implementing women’s
rights increasingly refer to women’s rights under Shari’a
rather than under international human rights law, which
does not challenge gender inequality (Abdullah 2002:169–
171). Local leaders in many parts of the world resist the
human rights claims of subordinated groups by asserting
that this is an alien, Western import not suited to local
normative systems, a position framed most strongly in the
C 2006 by the American Anthropological Association.
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 108, Issue 1, pp. 38–51, ISSN 0002-7294, electronic ISSN 1548-1433.
All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights
and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.
Merry • Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism
claim that “Asian values” are distinct from human rights
(see Bauer and Bell 1999).
In this article, I explore the practice of human rights,
focusing on where and how human rights concepts and institutions are produced, how they circulate, and how they
shape everyday lives and actions. It is part of a move within
anthropology to skirt the universalism–relativism debate,
which preoccupied anthropologists in the 1990s, and to focus instead on the social processes of human rights implementation and resistance. It does not debate the universality of human rights or the theoretical opposition between
culture and rights. Instead of asking if human rights are a
good idea, it explores what difference they make (see Cowan
et al. 2001; Rajagopal 2003; Wilson 1997).
Understanding how human rights circulate and are
transplanted raises larger questions about how cultural life
is changing in response to globalization and its deepening inequalities in wealth and power. It is not clear how
the spread of human rights institutions and discourses is
reshaping these inequalities. Is human rights law simply
a strategic weapon used by powerful groups to legitimate
their power grabs—a window dressing for real politik? Is
it a form of neoimperialism by which the West claims to
save the benighted, savage peoples of the rest of the world
while actually pursuing its own interests? Is it increasing
global cultural homogeneity by introducing a discourse of
social justice based on rights rather than reconciliation or
responsibility, foregrounding individuals at the expense of
communities? To what extent does it provide an emancipatory tool for vulnerable people such as women, racial
minorities, or indigenous peoples? To what extent does it
contribute to diminishing the oppressive control that community leaders or the state exercise over the marginalized
and poor? Are there ways it promotes social equality, the
rule of law, and protection against the ravages of the market? Does it help women contest the structures of patriarchy that govern their lives? Clearly, there are no simple
answers to these pressing questions, but in this article, I
seek to develop an analytical framework for studying the localization of human rights that facilitates addressing these
In this article, I use empirical examples of the appropriation of women’s human rights to analyze the process by which human rights are remade in the vernacular,
contributing to the development of an ethnography of the
practice of human rights. Women’s human rights are a distinctive facet of human rights in that they are still new and
regarded as marginal by many human rights institutions.
The central focus of women’s rights activism has been on
violence against women. The causes of this violence are social, economic, and political, often involving poverty, displacement, armed conflict, and state policies, but the human rights system conceptualizes violence against women
largely as individual injuries. Indeed, feminists have long
been skeptical about rights approaches to gender violence
because of the narrow conception of the problem embedded
in this discourse.
As ideas from transnational sources travel to small communities, they are typically vernacularized, or adapted to
local institutions and meanings. The concept of “vernacularization” was developed to explain the 19th-century process by which national languages in Europe separated, moving away from the medieval transnational use of Latin and
creating a new and more differentiated sense of nationhood in Europe (Anderson 1983). Human rights language
is similarly extracted from the universal and adapted to
national and local communities. The term indigenization
refers to shifts in meaning—particularly to the way new
ideas are framed and presented in terms of existing cultural
norms, values, and practices. Indigenization is the symbolic dimension of vernacularization. It is commonly used
in development programs as well as human rights implementation. For example, Kim Berry (2003:86–87) describes
how, in India, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that
focuses on women’s development employs slides of preAryan goddesses to develop a concept of “feminine spiritual power,” or shakti, as a way for women to imagine their
power to contest all forms of oppression. The NGO staff
members interweave practices and discourses from the locality, from elsewhere in the country, and from outside India to produce a hybrid feminist discourse of shakti. This
discourse produces new subjectivities that are embraced by
members and negotiated along with prior ones (Berry 2003:
A key dimension of the process of vernacularization is
the people in the middle: those who translate the discourses
and practices from the arena of international law and legal
institutions to specific situations of suffering and violation.
Intermediaries or translators work at various levels to negotiate between local, regional, national, and global systems of meaning. Translators refashion global rights agendas for local contexts and reframe local grievances in terms
of global human rights principles and activities. However,
the source of global ideas and institutions is usually another locality that has developed an idea or practice that is
translated into a form that circulates globally and is then
transplanted into another locality. This work is done by actors who move between the discourses of the localities they
work with, taking ideas from one place and redefining them
or adapting them to another.1 Multiple translators connect
transnationally circulating discourses and particular social
The term local is, of course, deeply problematic here, as
is its oppositional twin global. In the context of discussions
of transnationalism, local tends to stand for a lack of mobility, wealth, education, and cosmopolitanism, as well as recalcitrant particularity, whereas global encompasses the ability to move across borders, to adopt universal moral frameworks, and to share in the affluence, education, and cosmopolitan awareness of elites from other parts of the world.
Thus, social class, education, travel, and transnational consciousness blend with geography in defining these terms.
Clearly, the cluster of ideas evoked by local and global goes
far beyond spatial referents. Their wider array of meanings
American Anthropologist • Vol. 108, No. 1 • March 2006
is relevant to understanding the process of localizing human rights. Despite considerable critique of the use of the
terms global and local and numerous studies that show that
things we call “global” are often circulating locals, these
terms have a recalcitrant tendency to shape discussions of
transnational phenomenon.
Translators are both powerful and vulnerable. They
work in a field of conflict and contradiction, able to manipulate others who have less knowledge than they do but
still subject to exploitation by those who installed them. As
knowledge brokers, translators channel the flow of information but they are often distrusted, because their ultimate
loyalties are ambiguous and they may be double agents.
They are powerful in that they have mastered both of the
discourses of the interchange, but they are vulnerable to
charges of disloyalty or double-dealing. Their translation
skills can undermine the communities they represent, as
in the famous cases of La Malinche and Sacajawea. They
usually have greater knowledge and commitment to one
side than the other. Translation takes place within fields of
unequal power. Translators’ work is influenced by who is
funding them; their ethnic, gender, or other social commitments; and institutional frameworks that create opportunities for wealth and power. They may have greater interest in the source than the target of the transaction or vice
versa. Moreover, translators work within established discursive fields that constrain the repertoire of ideas and practices
available to them.
Translators are not always successful. New ideas and
practices may be ignored, rejected, or folded into preexisting institutions to create a more hybrid discourse and
organization. Or they may be subverted: seized and transformed into something quite different from the transnational concept, out of the reach of the global legal
system but nevertheless called by the same name. Some of
those who talk about women’s human rights under Shari’a
in northern Nigeria, for example, envision a different set
of rights from those articulated in international human
rights conventions. The leader of an Islamic women’s organization in northern Nigeria told me that one reason
women suffer fistula problems from protracted childbirth
is that when their husbands are away they cannot get
permission to leave the house to seek medical care. They
teach young women that they have rights under Shari’a
to leave the house under these circumstances, but they do
not talk about women’s human rights under international
law. In the context of the recent politicized expansion of
Shari’a criminal law in many northern Nigerian states, references to women’s rights under Shari’a are more likely
to be accepted than human rights arguments. In this context, women’s human rights become women’s rights under
Violence against women has been a key issue for women’s
movements in many parts of the world, but only recently
has it been defined as a human rights violation. The battered
women’s movement that began in Europe and North America in the 1970s sought to improve the position of women
through a variety of social interventions such as counseling,
shelters, and the strengthening of laws and enforcement
practices at the local and national level (Schechter 1982).
Similar movements focusing on violence against women
developed in other parts of the world at the same time (see
Basu 1995; Butalia 2002). After a decade of mobilization
and pressure, in 1993 women’s groups succeeded in persuading the world conference on human rights in Vienna
to declare that women’s rights are human rights (Friedman
1995). The Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995,
often called the “Beijing Conference,” produced an influential policy document, “The Platform for Action,”
which defined violence against women and women’s human rights as two of 12 key areas for action from governments, the international community, and civil society (United Nations 1996:33–34; see also Riles 1998). The
major women’s human rights convention, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), included this issue with a new
general recommendation in 1992. Many women’s groups
around the world worked to establish the idea that violence against women is a human rights violation, but
battered women’s groups still put priority on providing
shelter and social services to battered women, passing national laws against domestic violence, enhancing the criminal justice response, and raising public awareness of the
Although it had begun earlier, during the 1990s and
2000s, core human rights principles concerning women
spread more extensively from their global sites of production in New York and Geneva to local settings around the
world. How did these ideas travel? What are the paths by
which human rights ideas become relevant to local settings?
How are states, the entities responsible for enforcing human rights and often the major violators, involved in the
process? The intense debates between universalists and relativists of the 1990s highlighted the question of how human rights ideas move across cultural contexts. Universalists claimed that human rights are powerful because of their
universality and should be adopted in all cultural contexts
despite differences from local normative systems, whereas
relativists argued that human rights ideas should not be
imposed on societies with different value systems. Activists
point out that human rights will spread more effectively
and with greater legitimacy if they are adapted to local cultural contexts and systems of law (see An-Na’im 1992; AnNa’im and Hammond 2002; Coomaraswamy 1994). There
has been little anthropological attention to the process by
which universal human rights ideas are adopted and applied locally, particularly in areas other than indigenous
rights (but see Cowan et al. 2001). The nature of cultural translation is an old anthropological problem, but the
globalization of human rights discourse raises it in a new
Merry • Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism
The theoretical question—how do human rights ideas become adopted in a wide variety of culturally distinct
communities?—is one instance of a broader question about
how ideas and institutions move from one sociocultural
setting to another. It raises the question of how concepts
can be translated between social and cultural contexts. Understanding when and how cultural translation is possible has long been an issue in anthropology. The famous
Gluckman–Bohannan debate in legal anthropology was
ostensibly about how to do comparative research but was
fundamentally about the difficulties of translation. Max
Gluckman argued that it was possible to interpret the legal behavior of the Barotse people through the categories of
Western law to make comparisons between Lozi and Western law (1955, 1997). He identified broadly similar features
of legal reasoning between Barotse and European law such
as the idea of the “reasonable man.”
Paul Bohannan countered, on the basis of his research
on the Tiv, that legal categories are folk categories that
should be understood in their own terms (1997). He peppered his ethnography of Tiv law with Tiv words, arguing
that translating them into English terms to make comparisons distorted their meaning (Bohannan 1957). Bohannan accused Gluckman of doing “backward translation” by
reading Lozi law through Western legal terms (Bohannan
1997:411). This enabled Gluckman to show that the Lozi
judicial process was similar to that of Western society, yet
Bohannan claimed that these similarities appeared because
Gluckman had used Western law to understand Lozi law
in the first place (1997:411). As anthropologists recognized
the difference between folk terms and analytic terms and
that comparison relies on analytic categories, the debate
subsided (see Nader 1997). However, the underlying question regarding how translating one set of cultural categories
and meanings into another transforms them has not been
resolved. Nevertheless, ideas and institutions now circulate
globally at a dizzying speed, and translations and mistranslations happen all the time.
One approach to understanding the adoption of rights
discourse is through the concept of “framing,” which was
developed by social movement theorists to analyze what
makes an idea persuasive in a social movement. Frames are
not themselves ideas but ways of packaging and presenting ideas that generate shared beliefs, motivate collective
action, and define appropriate strategies of action (Snow
et al. 1986; Tarrow 1998). David Snow uses the term framing
to refer to the signifying work of social movement activists:
“They frame, or assign meaning to and interpret relevant
events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize
potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander
support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford
1988:198). The frame is an interpretive package surrounding a core idea (Ferree 2003:308). It can produce significant
change in individual consciousness about an issue or prob-
lem or more broadly in a wider domain in a manner similar
to religious conversion (Snow 2004:394). Indigenization occurs when an innovation is framed in terms of local symbols
and terminology. In social movements, the products of this
framing activity are called “collective action frames.” These
frames can have powerful effects on the way situations are
understood and on the tactics their supporters deploy (Khagram et al. 2002:12–13).
Social movement theorists point out that the frame
needs to be resonant with cultural traditions and narratives to be appealing (Snow 2004:401). Snow et al. argue
that—all else being equal—the higher the degree of frame
resonance, the greater the likelihood it will be successful
(1986:477). However, Myra Marx Ferree counters that resonant discourses are less radical than nonresonant ones, and
that some movement leaders may chose the nonresonant
approach to induce greater social change in the long run
(2003:305). Indeed, resonance is a costly choice because it
may limit the possibility of long-term change. Choosing
resonance requires sacrificing ideals, limiting demands on
authorities, and possibly excluding significant groups and
their demands from the movement (Ferree 2003:340).
This is precisely the problem human rights activists
confront: If they present human rights as compatible with
existing ways of thinking, these ideas will not induce
change. It is only their capacity to challenge existing power
relations that offers radical possibilities (see Chanock 2000).
For example, the success of the battered women’s movement in the United States depended on fundamentally
changing the way women understood violence from their
partners, shifting it from discipline to abuse. However, to
be adopted, human rights ideas must be framed in indigenous cultural categories. Translators must assess to what
extent they can challenge existing modes of thinking and
to what extent they must conceal radical ideas in familiar
Frame theory has been criticized for its overly fixed understanding of frames, however. Mark Steinberg argues that
the metaphors of frame and package suggest that these discourses operate as bounded and linked issue statements, ignoring the continuous contestation over meanings, their
ambiguity, and their susceptibility to change (1999:740).
He suggests talking about collective action discourses as
repertoires rather than frames (Steinberg 1999:750). Frame
analysis neglects the constraints that discourse imposes on
actors, who must work within established, often hegemonic, discursive fields that determine which frameworks
are available. Actors have unequal power to reshape these
fields (Steinberg 1999:742, 747–748). Steinberg advocates a
more dialogic analysis that sees the production of meaning
as contested, shaped both by group conflict and by the internal dynamics of the discourse itself (1999:737). From a
social semiotic perspective, meanings are produced by the
interaction between systems of signs and social action, so
that words may be interpreted differently by activists and
their targets. Given the multivocality of messages, it is possible for actors and targets to interpret these signs differently
American Anthropologist • Vol. 108, No. 1 • March 2006
than intended. There are limits to the capacity of the producers of these discourses to control their meanings.
Human rights translators work in situations of this
kind, within the constraints of existing discursive fields
whose complex and multivocal messages are open to various, and uncontrollable, interpretations. Human rights intermediaries put global human rights ideas into familiar
symbolic terms and use stories of local indignities and violations to give life and power to global movements. They
hold a double consciousness, combining both transnational human rights concepts and local ways of thinking
about grievances. They may be local activists, human rights
lawyers, feminist NGO leaders, academics, or a host of other
people who have one foot in the transnational community and one at home. They are constrained by the human
rights discourse and by the cultural meanings of the situation where they are working.
Translators negotiate the middle in a field of power and
opportunity. On the one hand, they have to speak the language of international human rights preferred by international donors to get funds and global media attention. On
the other hand, they have to present their initiatives in cultural terms that will be acceptable to at least some of the
local community. As they scramble for funds, they need to
select issues that international donors are interested in—
such as female genital cutting, women’s empowerment, or
the trafficking of women and children—and connect these
agendas to problems that interest local populations—such
as clean drinking water, more jobs, or good roads. State policies may silence these efforts or subvert them into reinforcing forms of male authority even as they seem to be promoting women’s human rights.
These people translate up and down. They reframe local grievances up by portraying them as human rights violations. They translate transnational ideas and practices down
as ways of grappling with particular local problems. In other
words, they remake transnational ideas in local terms. At the
same time, they reinterpret local ideas and grievances in the
language of national and international human rights. Those
occupying the middle are no longer the village headmen of
colonial indirect rule but activists providing services and
advocacy to local communities. They work within national
and transnational movements and discourses of justice and
seek to place the experiences of poor people in urban and
rural areas in these frameworks.
This process of cultural translation is familiar to anthropologists, who typically translate the cultural worlds
of the people they study into the cultural worlds of their
readers and students. Cultural translation is also central to
the work of applied anthropologists, who often mediate
between groups such as indigenous peoples and the state
or corporations. As anthropologists pay increasing attention to the inequalities in power involved in this process,
they are more reflexive about their own practice (see, e.g.,
Abu-Lughod 1993; Clifford and Marcus 1986). As Talal Asad
(1986:163–164) notes, languages themselves are unequal in
power, as a result of global inequalities of wealth and power.
Translating from a “weaker” language into a “stronger” one,
such as from a “Third World” into a “First World” language, means translating from a less powerful language to
a more powerful one. Because of these differences among
languages, determined by professional, national, and international factors, the process of “cultural translation” can
be an act of power, especially when it means reinterpreting
one set of experiences and categories in terms of another
more powerful one. Just as anthropologists translate local
experiences into written texts or films in dominant global
languages, so human rights translators take local grievances
and translate them up into the more powerful language of
transnational human rights. This usually means framing
the stories differently than the victims do, but the target
actors, such as states, may be more responsive to demands
framed this way.2
Anthropologists have long been fascinated with people
who occupy middle positions, translating between worlds
above and worlds below. Max Gluckman’s analysis of the
position of the village headman in British Central Africa
under British colonial governance is a classic example
(1949:93–94). After delineating the importance of the village headman in many societies of Central Africa, he notes
that there is a tension between the headman’s position in
the village, which uneasily pairs his leadership in a web of
kinship ordered by diffuse moral sanctions with his political power supported by legal and political authority. The
latter includes his role as a key (although unpaid) official in
the British colonial administration. The headman and his
followers in the village share a common set of values but do
not accept those of the British. Nevertheless, the headman
is held responsible by the British for reporting suspicious
deaths, illnesses, and strangers and for making sure that his
villagers keep the village clean, hoe paths, use latrines, follow agricultural and veterinary regulations, and pay taxes.
Gluckman notes that the headman is no more eager than
the villagers to accept these as good practices, but he must
nevertheless enforce the rules because if he does not, he
is liable to be punished by fining, imprisonment, and ultimately deposition by the state. “As he applies these unwelcome and unaccepted rules, his position becomes subject to
still greater strains” (1949:94).
Thus, Gluckman’s analysis of the headman provides insight into the dilemma of intermediaries, more generally:
They hold power by virtue of their ability to look both ways
and work with conflicting value systems. Yet they are vulnerable because the power delegated by higher authorities
demands concessions resisted by villagers while the villagers
make demands unacceptable to the colonial authorities. An
intermediary in a colonial situation is readily exploited by
those who put him or her into this position of power, but he
or she is also capable of exploiting those under his or her
control. The possibilities of manipulation run both ways.
The headman, like other intermediaries, is constrained by
those who endowed him with authority and his followers’ suspicion but has new opportunities to control others and to enrich himself. In British colonial Africa, village
Merry • Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism
headmen often used their power to retain or assert male
control over land and resources, incorporating assumptions
of male authority brought by the British.
The position of the development consultant is in many
ways parallel to that of the human rights activist. In development as in human rights implementation, competing
ideas of action, objectivity, and value coexist and must be
translated in situations of substantial inequality. The consultant, as broker and translator, is caught in the middle.
In his fascinating ethnographic study of an organizational
improvement project in Ruritania, funded by Normland,
Richard Rottenburg (2002) describes the tensions created
by differences in perspectives, classifications, and priorities
that various actors and organizations bring to the project.3
The development bank, the national development ministry,
the Normland consultant, the water ministry, the regional
and urban administration, and finally the management of
the Ruritanian urban water utilities all held differing expectations. After 20 years of investing in the country’s water
supply system, Normland’s development bank wanted to
solve the water system’s lack of economic viability rather
than building new capacity. The key problem was the small
percentage of consumers who actually paid for their water—
only about 30 percent. However, generating an accurate
list of customers proved a political as well as administrative nightmare, for which the language of technical development was completely inadequate. Nevertheless, the
demands of a structure that required collaboration between
the African water engineers and the development consultants meant that this issue remained the subject of a purely
technical conversation. A “metacode” based on ideas of
development, progress, and technical expertise dominated
discussions, although the problems were largely based on
political and organizational arrangements rather than the
technologies of water production (Rottenburg 2002:232).
In his analysis of this development project, Rottenburg
describes chains of translation (Uebersetzungsketten) along
which interpretations of situations and facts are developed
at various stages of reporting results, which then become the
basis for further interpretations. These chains stretch from
the situation in the urban water utilities of Ruritania to the
headquarters of the development bank to the political process in Normland where politicians must justify the expenditure of tax money on development projects (Rottenburg
2002:228–229). At each point, facts are gathered, classified,
and separated into individual units that have been delineated in the project documents, subject always to further
subdivision and reclassification within a particular context.
As data is subdivided and reclassified, its underlying fragility
and unreliability is converted into an appearance of stability and solidity. This leads in some cases to a transformation
of the data into forms that promote the ultimate goal of the
project and avoid the appearance of mistakes.
The consultant is in the position of negotiating between the donor and the recipient. The recipients, who
have resisted supplying the information on customers and
the details of the water supply system, see the consultant
as Other and are suspicious of him, but at the same time
ask him to produce the numbers necessary for the project
to proceed. The donor wants the project to go forward,
so he ignores the concerns of the consultant that the customer data is not forthcoming. Both leave the consultant
apparently responsible for the failure of the project. The intermediary becomes the “fall guy.” The African water officials claim he failed to provide adequate data and view him
suspiciously as the source of development problems while
the donor sees him as failing to meet project goals in time
(Rottenburg 2002:70–83).
Ironically, the African managers are the strongest advocates of a universal approach to water utility management
and standards of objectivity. This allows them to present
themselves as worthy partners in development yet insulates
them from the European managers by assuring them they
are carrying out the work according to universal principles
so that further intervention and inspection are unnecessary.
The universalist facade obscures the fact that things are still
being done in local ways.
Rottenburg’s study highlights the creative work of
intermediaries navigating between different and incompatible perspectives on a shared task as well as their vulnerability to those who refuse to cooperate or maintain unrealistic
expectations of the other side. The intermediaries exercise
power in their mastery of the technicalities of report writing, yet they are vulnerable as they sift and sort flawed data
to fit into predetermined goals.
There are clear parallels with the translation of human
rights ideas from a transnational metacode of human rights
law to local situations. Local leaders are often eager to appear compliant with human rights expectations while continuing to act in noncompliant ways. Following the form
and language of human rights while ignoring local violations is a common practice for government leaders. Human
rights translators, like development consultants, are often
caught in the middle. As Stacy Pigg observes, however, the
development process itself, with its emphasis on transnational expertise juxtaposed to local “traditional culture,”
creates the stark oppositions that then require mediators to
negotiate (1997:265). Human rights discourse similarly juxtaposes a transnational expertise to the problems posed by
“culture,” which include “harmful traditional practices.”
To what extent the adoption of human rights concepts leads
to a shift in subjectivity is a complicated question. Translators can produce a dramatic shift in subjectivity, analogous to conversion. For example, I watched a translator help
a battered woman in Hawai‘i understand her experiences
in new ways. When she described to a women’s support
group that her partner had forced her to have sexual relations, the leader of the group pointed out that this was a
case of rape. The speaker paused, then said with some surprise in her voice that it had felt like rape, so that must be
what it was. She saw the act differently when it was called
American Anthropologist • Vol. 108, No. 1 • March 2006
“rape.” It became a violation of her body and her rights
rather than a performance of wifely duty. However, it is
probably more common for people to adopt human rights
frameworks pragmatically and strategically than through
conversion. In a social movement against male-only inheritance of family land in the New Territories of Hong Kong
in 1993, for example, Hong Kong feminist activists persuaded a group of indigenous women to see their exclusion from houses and land as gender discrimination and a
human rights violation rather than only as poor treatment
by their male kin (Merry and Stern 2005). This framing enabled them to mobilize protest in a way that was heard by
the public and by the Legislative Council but did not lead
to long-term changes in their rights subjectivity.
Battered women and others who experience injuries
that can be defined as rights violations tend to adopt this
new framework by layering it over others such as fair treatment by kinsmen (see Merry 2006). The new interpretation
rarely displaces older ones. Just as the battered woman in
Hawai‘i came to see herself as violated by her partner as
well as a victim of a crime, so the indigenous women in
Hong Kong came to see themselves as abused by their male
kin who failed to endow them with the right to inherit land
equally with male relatives or to take care of them. Whether
the rights layer of understanding endures or not depends
in part on the institutional response claimants receive. My
research on battered women suggested that they generally
took a pragmatic approach, trying out a rights framework
but dropping it if the courts, police, and prosecutors trivialized their problems (Merry 2003). In Hong Kong, the indigenous women’s enthusiasm for rights activism dropped
off after they discovered that the new inheritance law did
not benefit them personally (Merry and Stern 2005).
Vernacularization falls along a continuum depending on
how extensively local cultural forms and practices are incorporated into imported institutions. At one end is replication, a process in which the imported institution remains
largely unchanged from its transnational prototype. The
adaptation is superficial and primarily decorative. At the
other end is hybridization, a process that merges imported
institutions and symbols with local ones, sometimes uneasily. These differences are a matter of degree. Of course,
imported ideas and institutions may be rejected outright.
Sometimes they are subverted, such as occurs when the
name and transnational referent are retained but the content of the ideas and the structure of the organization is
dramatically changed.
In translation by replication, the transnational model sets
the overall organization, mission, and ideology of an intervention while the local context provides its distinctive
content. The transnational idea remains the same, but local
cultural understandings shape the way the work is carried
out. Of course, the global prototype has been developed in
another local situation before being launched into global
circulation. Some of its original content is stripped away in
the process, although some remains. One example is the effort to adapt a U.S. batterer’s treatment program to Chinese
concepts of masculinity. This program was developed by a
women’s center in Hong Kong. Women’s centers first developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s in North America and
Europe to encourage and educate women that they had the
right not to be hit and to take their batterers to court. Most
centers provide counseling for women, legal assistance, and
in some cases temporary housing. Some also offer training
programs for the men who are violent. This is in effect a human rights intervention because the training is justified as
the protection of women’s human rights. The technology
of batterer-treatment programs comes from Euro-American
traditions of therapeutic intervention in family situations
and from law: Men are taught how to recognize their anger
and identify their feelings and are told that their partners
have rights to equality and freedom from violence (Merry
1995, 2001). They are told that their violence is a crime. This
movement began outside the state, although it increasingly
relies on state resources to run shelters and women’s support programs; however, it must continually exert pressure
on states to maintain these resources.
By 1985, Hong Kong opened its first center for battered women, which was named “Harmony House.” It was
started by U.S. and British activists, who employed models
from the United States and the United Kingdom, as well
as by Hong Kong residents who had experience working in
the battered women’s movement in North America. When
I interviewed the executive director in 2002, she told me
that she had spent ten years in Canada working on family violence before coming to Harmony House. At first, the
center described its program as promoting women’s welfare rights rather than human rights to deflect opposition
to a “Western”-sounding human rights approach (interview with author, March 2002). Subsequently, the program
talked more about human rights. By 2002, three other centers had opened in Hong Kong, offering shelter; hotlines;
counseling; legal, financial, and housing assistance; support groups; and tutorial groups for children. All the centers were operated with considerable private funding and
limited state support (Tang et al. 1999; Yeung 1991:35).
When I interviewed them in 2002, several staff members
of women’s centers in Hong Kong told me that it was important to indigenize these institutions.
In 1995, one of these centers initiated a treatment program for men who batter their wives. The idea of training
men who batter not to use violence against their spouses developed in several cities in the United States and the United
Kingdom in the early 1980s. Some of the best known are
Emerge in Boston and the Duluth, Minnesota, Domestic
Abuse Intervention Program with its iconic “power/control
wheel,” expressing the theory that battering is fundamentally about power and control (Pence and Paymar
1993). U.S. programs for batterers focus on teaching anger
Merry • Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism
management, violence control, and gender equality, and
they employ feminist theories that see domestic violence as
an expression of patriarchy. They teach men how to avoid
using power and control tactics against their partners. Many
of the programs are mandated by courts when a batterer has
been convicted or is the subject of a restraining order (see
Merry 1995).
In 1997, Chan Ko Ling, a graduate social work student
at the University of Hong Kong, began research on programs
for batterers. His goal was to develop an indigenous batterer
treatment program grounded in the values of Chinese masculinity. He hoped this approach would help social workers understand why men had such difficulty talking about
their problems with violence and suggest a more culturally
appropriate strategy for working with these men. He was, in
other words, transplanting a local North American program
into the Hong Kong context but adapting it to Chinese culture. His dissertation (Chan 2000) describes his exploration
of Chinese conceptions of honor, family, relationships, and
achievement, then explains how these ideas prevent men
from talking to others about their problems and seeking
help for their violence. In 2002, I interviewed him in Hong
Kong about his research and his dissertation.
Chan participated with two social workers in running
two groups, each of which had a two-hour session once a
week for eight weeks. He interviewed 19 men before and
after the program.4 Chan argues that it is very difficult for
these men to talk about their violence, given Chinese conceptions of gender, face, and marital relationships. In North
America, when men refuse to talk about their violence, the
leaders see this as denial and minimization of the violence.
However, Chan suggests accepting the Hong Kong men’s
stories in their own terms, including ideas of “face” and
“rightness” (yi), rather than reacting in a judgmental way,
which encourages the men to talk (2000:166). He explores
Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist traditions of family life,
emphasizing the importance of the concept of “yi” as the
place in which a program should begin (Chan 2000:146).
The idea of a “yi husband and following wife” means that
men are to be committed to and responsible for the marriage relationship and expect their wives to be obedient and
submissive. When marital relations do not follow this pattern, men sometimes become violent (Chan 2000:318). The
concept of “face,” the public representation of one’s self, is
also important because personal success is linked to “face”
(Chan 2000:130, 148). Because an individual receives help
from others depending on how they perceive his power and
status, maintaining face in front of others is critical (Chan
2000:144). A man’s face is affected by the actions of his
wife, who can diminish his face and therefore his power in
social relationships. Aggression is the strongest form of facesaving strategy. Interpreting domestic violence in this way
shifts responsibility for the violence to the woman, who is
viewed as responsible for the loss of face (Chan 2000:148–
This model of Chinese masculinity explains why Chinese men have difficulty seeking help. To talk about their
violence is to disclose family secrets and personal weaknesses, leading them to feel embarrassed and to lose face.
They are reluctant to participate in this voluntary program.
In 2002, Chan told me that his program had held only five
groups in seven years, a total of about 30 participants, yet
during the same period, 6,000 cases of spouse abuse were
reported to the social welfare department, 90 percent of
which were perpetrated by men. Perhaps making it more
indigenous would increase its appeal. Chan also advocates
shifting the programs to be more similar to their U.S. prototypes: “Mandatory counseling for batterers, aimed at managing the emotions, anger control and abusive beliefs of
batterers, should be encouraged by the government” (2000:
Chan theorizes that Chinese batterers suffer from an
impaired ability to differentiate the self, citing a U.S. text
on family therapy. In the Chinese context, the undifferentiated self is the product of rigid cultural beliefs of yi and
putting the pursuit of yi over the fulfillment of personal
needs (Chan 2000:387). Chan concludes: “The more rigid
the definition of masculinity in yi, the more serious the
undifferentiation of self, and thus the lower is the capacity
of conflict resolution. As a result, the higher will be the
probability of using violence against their female partners”
(2000:421). He told me that the problem is not traditional
beliefs but the rigidity with which these men hold them.
He emphasizes the positive side of traditional values, such
as nonviolence, as well as the value of greater flexibility in
Chan describes a program with local cultural content
but imported structure, aims, and methods. Despite references to Chinese tradition, it is still a group-therapy program with two-hour weekly meetings where people talk
about feelings. Western ideas that the self must be disentangled from others to deal with conflict shape his approach,
along with Chinese conceptions of masculinity. Chan advocates making the program mandatory, parallel to U.S. initiatives that treat problems such as drug use and battering with
therapeutic discussions in the shadow of the law. Theoretically and analytically, this work builds on Western social
science. The “local cultural content” is also complicated.
Given the British colonial past and current global connections of Hong Kong residents, Chinese masculinity is hardly
a stable entity rooted in past religious beliefs. The city is
at the center of international trade networks and highly
cosmopolitan. Conceptions of masculinity for the workingclass clients differ from those of business elites and again
from that of poor mainland Chinese immigrants.
As a doctoral student and now professor of social work
and social administration at the University of Hong Kong,
Chan is a translator. He is fluent in both English and Cantonese, U.S. theories of psychology and domestic violence,
and Chinese conceptions of masculinity. Chan frequently
visits North America for conferences and works with a leading family violence researcher in the United States.5 In his
dissertation, he says that participating in the program and
listening to the men helped him to reflect on being a man
American Anthropologist • Vol. 108, No. 1 • March 2006
in his social context: “Surprisingly, I found that we shared
common beliefs of masculinity, though we acted out differently” (Chan 2000:v). He says he has learned how to be
nonabusive and nondominating in his relationship with his
wife. Thus, he is a bridge between conceptions of masculinity and violence in North America and China. His study
shows how a transplanted program can be symbolically indigenized but remain fundamentally unchanged in organization, ideology, and practices. Indeed, a program imported
from the West is likely to appeal to “local” conceptions of
modernity, particularly among Hong Kong’s feminist men
and women.
In 2000, during my research on domestic violence in
Hawai‘i, I twice visited a program developed in 1995 by a
Native Hawaiian Christian pastor who offered anger management programs and took referrals from the courts. The
meetings took place in his kitchen next to the large room
that served as the church meeting room. His program combined prayer, singing, and discussions of sin and forgiveness with an analysis of the way Native Hawaiians have
been oppressed by colonialism. At one meeting, the pastor
pointed out that Hawaiians have legitimate reasons to be
angry about the way they have been treated, but that it is
wrong to take that anger out on loved ones. He talked about
the ideal of the warrior as a person violent in war but not
at home. He discussed male violence from the perspective
of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement as well as Christian ideas that every person is worthy in the eyes of God
and can change given enough time, prayer, and the power
of God. His approach blends the discursive fields of global
Pentecostalism, the transnational indigenous rights movement, and feminist understandings of domestic violence.
Yet he retains the two-hour weekly group meeting format
and mandatory court referrals. The pastor must take attendance and inform the probation officer when he thinks a
person is finished, but he resists the court’s control and oversight as much as he can.
Both of these programs replicate North American theories of domestic violence as learned behavior and practices of therapeutic intervention in the shadow of the law
while adopting alternative cultural models of masculinity
and identity. Both are grounded in local culture as well
as transnational practices such as Chinese tradition, Hong
Kong modernity, Hawaiian identity, or evangelical Christianity. However, there seems to be less local cultural content in the Hong Kong program, whose translator is closer
to the source than the target, than in the Hawaiian program,
where the translator is closer to the target.
Vernacularization can take a more interactive form, with
symbols, ideologies, and organizational forms generated
in one locality merging with those of other localities to
produce new, hybrid institutions. One example is the nari
adalats, or women’s courts, that emerged in India in the
mid-1990s to promote women’s human rights. A national
women’s development program encouraged the formation
of poor village women’s collectives, and because violence
in the home was a major concern to many of the village
women, the women’s collectives developed women’s courts
to handle domestic violence, divorce, and other family conflicts. The development program encouraged women’s empowerment and human rights while the women leaders
of the courts blended these ideas with local norms, reliance on government authority, and references to human
The parent program, called “Mahila Samakhya,” is
a national-level rural women’s “empowerment” program
started by the Department of Education of the Government of India in 1989 with funding from the Dutch government (International Center for Research on Women
[ICRW] 1999–2002; Narayanan 2002; Sharma in press).
Mahila Samakhya (hereafter, MS) endeavored to promote
gender equality, development, and social change by empowering poor women and providing them the knowledge
and self-confidence to make changes (ICRW 1999–2002:32–
65; Poonacha and Pandey 1999:161; Sharma in press). The
program introduced human rights ideas to its clientele of
poor, illiterate women, many of whom are tribals or Dalits,
low-caste people.6
The philosophy of the MS program is that decision
making should rest with local-level collectives. The program
depends on a cadre of women activists, or sahyoginis, who
develop and encourage women’s collectives, or sanghas, in
each village. Each sahyogini works with a cluster of ten
villages and is supported by a more formal, governmentsupported leadership structure. This includes a program coordinator and four resource persons at the district level and
a program office with a director and resource personnel at
the state level. The MS staff is expected to bring skills and
commitments to women’s issues (Narayanan 2002:299).
Many come from NGO backgrounds and some have moved
more recently to leadership positions in other NGOs promoting women’s human rights (Sharma in press; interviews with author, January 2005). The MS program straddles
the government–NGO divide, claiming whichever identity
seems most helpful at the moment (Sharma in press). It
functions in the autonomous fashion of an NGO in some
contexts and as a government program in others. Although
Sahyoginis are paid by the government, they are not government employees and earn less than government workers
(Sharma in press). The largely female work force lacks job
security, pensions, and health benefits, and is poorly paid.7
Ironically, some were fired when they tried to unionize to
demand their rights to higher wages, suggesting limitations
on their ability to translate human rights ideas into their
local situations.
Nari adalats emerged in Gujarat in 1995 and in Uttar
Pradesh in 1998 as informal courts to handle women’s legal problems (ICRW 1999–2002:34). A 2001 study reported
that in the six years since they were initiated, the four nari
adalats in the Vadodara district handled about 1,200 cases
of marital violence, harassment, divorce, maintenance,
Merry • Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism
property, and child custody, and successfully resolved a majority of these. The clients were mostly low-caste and tribal
women (Krishnamurthy 2002:3, on the basis of MS Annual
Reports). In the early 1990s, during the first years of the
MS program, local leaders were trained by Jagori, a feminist resource and training center in Delhi. When the need
for a way of dealing with violence against women became
clear, the women received legal training (Krishnamurthy
2002:42).8 When I visited Jagori in 2001, the director said
that the program puts a strong emphasis on women’s
rights and refers to international conventions and treaties;
nevertheless, Indian sources of rights concepts are more
The nari adalat consists of a core team of sahyoginis and
selected sangha women, most of whom have poor literacy
skills and many of whom are dalits, people of low-caste status (ICRW 1999–2002:36). The members of the nari adalat
tour the district, meeting at regular days and times in public
places near government offices to dispense legal advice and
settle marital disputes (Poonacha and Pandey 1999:161–
178). For example, in 2005, a nari adalat in Gujarat met
next to the government court and police station, both of
which were supportive of the women’s efforts. The women
leaders, who tend to rely on collective leadership, are not
paid and their transportation is not covered. They have no
legal authority but rely on pressure and shaming. Like the
parent MS program, they straddle the government–NGO divide, claiming either identity as it seems helpful (Sharma in
Krishnamurthy’s ethnography describes how nari
adalats move creatively between community and state to
gain recognition in the villages and access to formal institutions (2002:12, 51). The women meet in government
compounds close to police and local government offices; assert their status as part of the official MS program; use state
symbols such as files, stamp paper, and seals; call on the
police for protection; and cite formal laws to support their
decisions, as they were trained to do by urban activists. Because they meet outside local government offices, they have
considerable impact on government workers (see Sharma in
press). At the same time, they reflect the communities from
which they come. They use humor and shaming to pressure litigants, adjust their meeting times to the rhythms
of village life, and use their knowledge of local practices,
customs, and social networks to gather evidence and negotiate agreements. They do not try to end marriages but
emphasize the rights of the woman within marriage (ICRW
1999–2002:51). Their authority is limited, and they seem to
be most successful in helping women arrange divorces and
escape violent marriages, particularly among poor families.
They are less successful with wealthy families and with cases
of rape and molestation, which require greater evidentiary
effort (ICRW 1999–2002:99). Some police and courts support these organizations because they think they are a good
way to deal with “women’s issues.”
An ICRW study in 1999–2000 indicated that the operation of these courts and the closely related women’s councils
(mahila panch) made violence in the home a more open and
public offense. ICRW evaluations of these programs indicate
that sangha and sahyogini women and those who experienced the nari adalats were more aware of their rights and
better able to speak up (1999–2002:40–41, 54). A counterculture based on resisting violence in terms of the intrinsic
rights of women is developing slowly, largely in local terms:
“Research documented the innovative ways in which activists use their local knowledge to reshape and reinterpret
community idioms, phrases and beliefs to create and persuade the community to adopt new perspectives” (ICRW
1999–2002:72). As they promote the ideology of human
rights, some women say they have learned to stand up for
Although the nari adalat was a new initiative, it appropriated a familiar political structure. The panchayat, as
the juridical institution of a caste (jati) or village, is a very
old institution used for hearing complaints and negotiating solutions to conflicts (Mayaram 2002:394; Meschievitz
and Galanter 1982:48–49). Many panchayats are caste based
and handle conflicts within the caste community. These put
caste interests first, focusing on maintaining caste honor
and promoting upward social mobility (see Galanter 1989;
Hayden 1987). In the late 19th century, the Indian government created simple judicial tribunals called panchayat
adalati to hear small cases, thus using similar terminology
(Meschievitz and Galanter 1982:50). After India’s independence, “democratic” panchayats were instituted by the state
and made responsible for local development. The lowest
tier, the village panchayat, was directly elected, although
still under the control of the state and local elites (Mayaram
In 1974, recognizing that village panchayats tend to
consist of men of the dominant castes, the Government of
India’s Committee on the Status of Women issued a report
that advocated creating women-only panchayats at the village level as a transitional measure to ensure women’s participation. However, in subsequent years, the idea of creating reservations for women in existing panchayats became a
major issue of the Indian women’s movement, and in a 1992
amendment to the Indian Constitution, 33 percent of the
seats in village panchayats were reserved for women. These
quotas have opened panchayat participation to women to
some extent, particularly in areas where the MS program
has provided training, the sanghs have been supportive,
and governments have been positive (Narayanan 2002:295;
Mayaram 2002:396–397). However, there have been differential levels of implementation around the country and
substantial resistance from males of dominant castes (see
Kapadia 2002).
Thus, the idea of women’s courts has a long history
in India. The creation of nari adalats also reflects the Indian women’s movement long-standing focus on violence
against women. Since the 1970s, women’s groups have
worked to diminish dowry murders, rape in police custody, widow immolation (sati) and battering in families
(Butalia 2002). The nari adalat is therefore an adaptation
American Anthropologist • Vol. 108, No. 1 • March 2006
of an existing structure, the panchayat, but it has women
members rather than men and is focused on issues concerning women rather than caste or village. It introduces new ideas of women’s empowerment and human
rights, as promoted by the cosmopolitan feminist leaders of the MS program, and supports a woman’s rights to
the return of some of her dowry at divorce and protection from cruel treatment, ideas that are already embedded in Indian law and supported by the Indian women’s
Within the nari adalat system, the key translators are
the sahyoginis and the leading sangha members. More educated and cosmopolitan Indian feminists working at the
higher levels in the MS program translate feminism and human rights ideas to the sahyoginis they train and support.
Although participation leads some poor women to stand
up for themselves, whether many have adopted core human rights ideas such as equality, autonomy, and bodily
integrity is questionable. The stories of women who participate in panchayats suggest that a few acquire a strong
rights subjectivity, but that many retreat in the face of violence, social pressure, and resistance from their own families
and caste communities when they take leadership positions
(Anadhi 2002; Mayaram 2002). In some areas, the state is
strongly opposed to women’s leadership, and in many areas grassroots women leaders face resistance from local male
Unlike replications, which are thinly adapted to local circumstances, hybrids such as the nari adalats are thickly
shaped by local institutions and structures. Replications retain the basic structure of the imported institution such as
therapy groups for batterers but overlay them with local
symbols such as ideas of yi and face. Hybrids merge local structures such as councils with imported ideas such
as women’s human rights. They draw more extensively on
local institutions, knowledge, idioms, and practices. In
replications, the source is relatively dominant, whereas
in hybrids, the target is more powerful. The hybrid seems to
offer greater opportunity for subversion despite superficial
The positioning of the intermediaries, their loyalties
and commitments, and their knowledge of both sides of the
interchange shapes the vernacularization process. Translators committed to the target produce more hybrid transplants whereas those closer to the source create replicas.
The sahyoginis who translated MS objectives into the nari
adalats were village women whereas the creator of the Chinese batterer treatment program was a cosmopolitan university professor. The Native Hawaiian pastor who tailored
his program to evangelical Christianity and Hawaiian experiences of colonial dispossession had closer connections
to the Hawaiian community than the feminist leaders of
the mainstream batterer treatment programs on the same
These examples illustrate the power and vulnerability
of the translator. The power of the translator is her ability to
set the terms of the exchange and to channel it, but her vulnerability is her ability to persuade people with grievances
to accept her definition of the problem and to extract financial and political support from states and donors. She
may confront violence and other forms of resistance. She is
constrained by her resources and institutional location. The
translator must walk a fine line between too much replication, in which case the new ideas will lose their appeal to
local communities, and too much hybridity, in which case
the reforms will lose the support of the global community,
including its funding and publicity.
Moreover, intermediaries are always suspect because
they are not fully in one world or the other. Like the village headman in British Central Africa, they are vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty by either side. The consultants in Ruritania were viewed with suspicion by the
African managers and held responsible for data problems
by the Normland donor agency. The sahyoginis face criticism and even violence from male family members and
male village elites for being too assertive, even though they
are supported by village sanghas and the educated feminist
MS leaders. The professor developing battering programs is
supported by the transnational family violence movement
but apparently has more difficulty winning the trust of the
These translators work within state systems whose commitment to women’s rights is at best ambivalent. For example, the sahyoginis are not paid adequately and were prevented from running for panchayat seats on the grounds
that they were state employees. Shail Mayaram (2002) describes how the radical women activists in a similar program in neighboring Rajasthan were disempowered and the
program was ultimately eliminated by the state. The Hong
Kong government failed to make batterer treatment programs mandatory. States often resist human rights laws and
obligations and undermine initiatives that challenge patriarchy. Under these conditions, states maintain an appearance of compliance while doing nothing or while doing
something that is quite different than what international
law specifies as human rights.
Moreover, translators are restricted by the discursive
fields within which they work. All the translators used human rights discourse, with its reference to international
standards and its focus on individual injury and cultural
oppression rather than structural violence. Despite the clear
connections between poverty, social marginality, and domestic violence, the batterer treatment program in Hong
Kong did not address these issues and the nari adalats
were powerless to challenge caste, class, and gender hierarchies. Although individual women were helped to deal
with violence and divorce, village inequalities remained
The larger structure of economic and political power
that surrounds human rights activism means that translation is largely a top-down process from the transnational
Merry • Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism
to the local and the powerful to the less powerful. Because
NGOs and social service programs are usually dependent
on international foundations or foreign government funding, they need to present their work in a way that inspires
these funders. Transnational human rights principles are
effective in attracting international funding and garnering
media attention. Organizations may adopt international
human rights language even when they would rather take
a different approach. Despite arguments that human rights
must be translated into local webs of meaning based on
religion, ethnicity, or place for them to appear both legitimate and appealing, translators must please their donors.10
As this analysis suggests, processes of vernacularization are
intimately connected to the interests of states and funders
as well as those of local communities.
Consequently, human rights ideas are not fully indigenized, even though this might make them more readily
accepted. They are embedded in a distinctive vision of the
good society that envisions the state as the provider of social
justice and the individual as responsible for making rights
claims on the state. This vision assumes that all people have
equal rights, although all do not have equal needs. As human rights are vernacularized, these conceptions of person,
state, and community remain the same. The failure to fully
indigenize these ideas impedes their spread, yet to do so
would undermine their potential for change. As Inderpal
Grewal (1998:507) points out, human rights are Eurocentric in origin and inspiration, yet, at the same time, they
are some of the only tools available to struggle for rights of
the disenfranchised.
This is the paradox of making human rights in the vernacular: To be accepted, they have to be tailored to the
local context and resonant with the local cultural framework. However, to be part of the human rights system, they
must emphasize individualism, autonomy, choice, bodily
integrity, and equality—ideas embedded in the legal documents that constitute human rights law. Whether this is
the most effective approach to diminishing violence against
women is still an open question. It is certainly an important
part of the expansion of a modernist view of the individual
and society embedded in the global North, which promotes
it along with democracy, the rule of law, capitalism, and the
free market. As translators vernacularize these transnational
institutions and ideas, they promote this modernist view,
with its emancipatory and homogenizing effects. Whether
or not they achieve an expanded human rights subjectivity
is far more uncertain.
S ALLY E NGLE M ERRY Department of Anthropology, New
York University, New York, NY 10003-6688
Acknowledgments. I am grateful to the Cultural Anthropology Program and Law and Social Sciences Program, National Science Foundation, BCS-9904441, for support for this research. I also appreciate
research support from Wellesley College and the Mellon New Directions Fellowship. I benefited from a fellowship year at the Carr
Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School, Harvard
University, and from a semester as a Visiting Fellow at the American
Bar Foundation. Mark Goodale, Richard Rottenburg, and Aradhana
Anu Sharma provided helpful comments on a draft of this article.
1. For example, Kim Berry discusses the way Indian policies toward
women’s development were shaped by the U.S. emphasis on the
woman as housewife in the 1950s, which echoed ideas of some local elites in India that a family’s honor is connected to a woman’s
confinement to the home. U.S. conceptualizations of female domesticity also dovetailed with Indian nationalist representations
of women as mothers of the nation (Berry 2003:84–85).
2. Studies of the dilemmas activists face in trying to win asylum
status for their clients underscore this dilemma. Both McKinley
(1997) and Ticktin (1999) show, in different cases, how an African
or South Asian woman’s story of abuse had to be reframed as one
in which she has been victimized by custom to win asylum status
in the United States and the United Kingdom.
3. Ruritania is an unnamed African country and Normland an unnamed European one.
4. The men were mainly working class, but a few were middle class.
Most reported significant job stress and financial difficulties (Chan
5. His vita on the web lists at least six visits to the United States
and Canada, four to China, and one to Europe, all for the purpose
of attending conferences or presenting papers.
6. It promoted women’s equality along with health, literacy, and
nonformal education, savings, political involvement, and community development initiatives. The program uses the terms conscientization and empowerment to describe the process by which women
collectively become aware of their situations and take action to
address their problems (Sharma in press).
7. In 1998, sahyoginis received only slightly above the
government-stipulated minimum wage for skilled work (Sharma
in press: see footnote xlii).
8. Seventeen women were trained as paralegals with a feminist
critique of the legal system and offered feminist approaches to violence against women and divorce (ICRW 1999–2002:49).
9. Given the historical processes of colonialism in Hawai‘i, Native Hawaiians’ experiences are shaped by dispossession and displacement. The feminist program, although sympathetic to these
grievances, focused primarily on gender oppression rather than
10. Local programs developed in affluent nations such as the
United States are more likely to circulate transnationally to poorer
ones than vice versa. This uneven circulation is driven by funders
and governments. Transnational imports are usually local conceptions from elsewhere launched into the transnational domain by
the economic and political power of their creators.
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